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PATENT SHOWDOWN AT THE  
N.D. C[ORR]AL 
PETER S. MENELL* 
ABSTRACT 
Software patent cases often present dozens of claims requiring 
tremendous effort and years of costly litigation to resolve. In a provocative 
essay, Judge William Alsup offers an innovative case management solution 
inspired by western frontier justice. As Judge Alsup warned attorneys in a 
recent case, tell your clients that “the day of reckoning is close at hand.” 
Modeled after the famous “Shootout at the OK Corral,” the “Showdown 
at the N.D. C[orr]al” aims to streamline patent litigation by requiring the 
patentee to choose its “best” claim and the defendant to choose the “weakest” 
claim for an early summary judgment showdown. Judge Alsup emphasizes 
the potentially severe stakes: “injunction city” if the patentee prevails and 
“big” sanctions if the claims fail. 
This article assesses whether Judge Alsup’s patent case management 
invention works for its intended purposes. Based on a review of the two 
showdowns to date, it concludes that the showdown procedure has yielded 
mixed results. The procedure, however, raises serious fairness concerns that 
could well lead to a bigger showdown at the Federal Circuit Corral. 
  
 
 *  Koret Professor of Law, Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, and Faculty Director, 
Berkeley Judicial Institute, University of California at Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful to Edward 
Lee, Mark Lemley, and Greg Reilly for comments on an earlier draft. They bear no responsibility for the 
views expressed. 
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It is an honor to comment on Judge, or perhaps more aptly, “Sheriff” 
William Alsup’s provocative approach to patent litigation on the digital 
frontier. 1  Judge Alsup is one of the most experienced, demanding, 
innovative, and no-nonsense intellectual property jurists in the nation. He 
rode into the N.D. C[orr]al with a lot of firepower: undergraduate training in 
math and engineering, years tinkering with radio devices,2 a clerkship with 
Justice William O. Douglas, 3  and extensive experience as an antitrust 
 
 1. See Hon. William Alsup, Huge Numbers of Patent Cases: How One District Judge Manages 
Them, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111 (2019). 
 2. See Sarah Jeong, The Judge’s Code, THE VERGE (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/19/16503076/oracle-vs-google-judge-william-alsup-interview-
waymo-uber. 
 3. In 1934, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed William O. Douglas, a young, 
idealistic, brash law professor who was skeptical of corporate power, to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. See generally BRUCE MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS (2003). Five years later, President Roosevelt appointed Douglas to the Supreme Court 
following the retirement of Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Justice Douglas’s appointment reinforced the 
Court’s shifting balance on economic regulation and antitrust enforcement. See United States v. Columbia 
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535–36 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We have here the problem of bigness. 
Its lesson should by now have been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows 
how size can become a menace—both industrial and social . . . . The philosophy of the Sherman Act is 
that it should not exist . . . . Industrial power should be decentralized . . .”); C. Paul Rogers III, The 
Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 895 (2008). Justice Douglas 
brought that skepticism of monopoly, bigness, and economic power to patent jurisprudence. See Cuno 
Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
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litigator at the U.S. Department of Justice and in private practice.4 He has 
been serving at the N.D. C[orr]al since 1999, just as the dot.com bubble5 was 
nearing its peak and, more significantly, during the tumultuous era after it 
burst. As a result, Judge Alsup has handled a good number of digital era 
patent cases. Of particular note, Judge Alsup serves as the trial judge in the 
epic battle between Oracle and Google over Google’s use of Java application 
programming interface components (“APIs”) in the Android mobile 
operating system.6 That case continues, nearly a decade after it began.7 Thus, 
it would be an understatement to say that Judge Alsup has had a front-row 
seat to the digital revolution. He has been an active and important participant. 
I have also enjoyed a pretty good vantage point. I wrote some early 
articles on legal protection for computer software at the dawn of the digital 
intellectual property revolution. 8  Soon after joining the Berkeley Law 
faculty in 1990, I laid the groundwork for the Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology (“BCLT”), which launched in 1995, just as the Internet was 
emerging. Soon thereafter, the Markman claim construction rulings 9 
generated significant changes in how patent cases were adjudicated. The 
following year I reached out to the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) to offer 
BCLT’s services in educating federal judges about the rising tide of 
 
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
patent power was to promote the progress of both science and the useful arts, thereby requiring “a 
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge” was a constitutional test for patentability); Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (expanding patent misuse); Funk Brothers Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (imposing tighter limits on patent eligibility); see 
generally Donald S. Chisum, Patenting Intangible Methods: Revisiting Benson (1972) after Bilski (2010), 
27 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 450 (2010) (remarking that “Justice Douglas was notoriously 
hostile toward the patent system”). By the end of Justice Douglas’s first decade on the high court, Justice 
Robert Jackson quipped that the Supreme Court’s passion for striking down patents might lead observers 
to conclude that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands 
on.” Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 4. See Jeong, supra note 2; Dan Farber, Judge William Alsup: Master of the Court and Java, CNET 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/judge-william-alsup-master-of-the-court-and-java/. 
 5. See Dot-com bubble, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dot-com_bubble. 
 6. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d and remanded, 
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), on remand, 2016 WL 3181206 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) and 2016 WL 
5393938 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016), rev’d and remanded, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2019); see 
Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of 
Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 433–52 (2018).  
 7. See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle 
v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515 (2016). 
 8. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 
(1987); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989). 
 9. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
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intellectual property litigation. The next summer the FJC sent 40 federal 
judges to UC-Berkeley for the first of what would prove to be over two 
decades of intensive courses on intellectual property law and case 
management. 
At around that time, Judge Ronald Whyte was grappling with the rise 
of patent litigation in the N.D. Cal.’s San Jose outpost. He convened patent 
practitioners to develop a pragmatic set of Patent Local Rules to structure the 
pretrial process.10 I worked with Judge Whyte to spread the gospel of patent 
local rules and early proactive judicial management of patent cases. Many 
other districts and judges adopted versions of these rules, which have 
streamlined and harmonized patent case management. 
This work became a career-long passion and pursuit. Since 1998, I have 
organized over 60 intellectual property education programs for federal 
judges, advised district courts on the development of patent local rules, and 
conducted studies on patent case management.11 Beginning in 2005, I led the 
development of the PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE, a 
comprehensive treatise for managing patent cases, now in its third edition.12 
Notwithstanding these efforts to streamline patent litigation, I share 
Judge Alsup’s view that patent litigation, particularly cases involving 
software patents and non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), remains one of the 
most complex, costly, and challenging areas of federal litigation. The case 
 
 10. See James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern 
District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 965 (2009). 
 11. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Peter S. Menell, & David O. Taylor, Final Report of the Berkeley 
Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 551 (2018) [hereinafter BCLT 101 Report]; Stuart Graham, Peter S. Menell, Carl 
Shapiro, & Timothy Simcoe, Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Patent Damages 
Workshop, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115 (2017); J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal 
Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of the Standard of Appellate Review for 
Patent Claim Construction, 108 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 1, (2014); Peter S. Menell, It’s Time to 
Make Vague Software Patents More Clear, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/02/its-
time-to-make-vague-software-patents-more-clear; Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed 
Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011) [hereinafter 
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness]. 
 12. See PETER S. MENELL, LYNN PASAHOW, MATTHEW POWERS, JAMES POOLEY, STEVEN 
CARLSON, JEFFREY HOMRIG, GEORGE PAPPAS, CAROLYN CHANG, COLETTE REINER MAYER, & MARC 
DAVID PETERS, PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE (3d ed. 2016; 2nd ed. 2012; 1st ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter PCMJG3d]. Professor Dennis Crouch characterized the PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
JUDICIAL GUIDE as “the patent litigator’s Bible.” See Dennis Crouch, Book Review: Justifying Intellectual 
Property, PATENTLYO (Oct. 14, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/merges-justifying-
intellectual-property.html. More recently, I co-authored a patent mediation guide. See KATHI VIDAL, 
LEERON G. KALAY, PETER S. MENELL, MATTHEW POWERS, & SARITA VENKAT, PATENT MEDIATION 
GUIDE (Federal Judicial Center 2019). 
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law is difficult to master and constantly evolving. The stakes can be 
enormous. Judges and juries struggle to understand the technology and 
economic damages theories propounded. 13  And the litigation typically 
unfolds in multiple venues—other district courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, the International Trade Commission, and foreign tribunals—
simultaneously. I also share Judge Alsup’s view that the patent system needs 
to be fixed.14 
Part I of this commentary sets the stage and assesses whether the patent 
showdown “invention” works for its intended purposes. Part II explores the 
broader challenges posed by software patent litigation. Part III comments on 
the pressures posed by crowded dockets on district judges. 
I. PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
Judge Alsup lassos the patent cases on his docket, like all of his cases,15 
with unusual tenacity. He works relentlessly to understand the science and 
engineering underlying the disputes, 16  applies an engineer’s problem-
solving determination and grit, and candidly experiments with novel case 
 
 13. The most revealing and compelling evidence of this proposition comes from one of Judge 
Alsup’s former colleagues, Paul Grewal, who served as a N.D. Cal. Magistrate Judge from 2010 to 2016. 
Paul earned his Bachelor of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering in 1993 from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He shared his views about the juror comprehension at a 
conference in 2017. After jury trials on which he presided concluded, he routinely met with jurors to get 
their impressions:  
“[O]ne consistent response, especially in the patent cases, raised alarm bells: most 
jurors understood almost nothing about the technical and economic evidence they 
just heard . . . . How could this be, with gatekeeping patent judges, and of course 
incredible patent trial counsel directing every element of the presentation? The 
answer, I’d suggest, requires far more candor that we are used to about how patent 
trials actually work. We are submitting IP disputes to intelligent, well-meaning, 
hard-working, good people who nevertheless in most cases lack any reasonable 
tools to do their jobs. Few of them could pass any kind of test on the technical 
subject matter presented. Fewer still can even articulate why they decided that one 
side’s thin distinction prevails over the others. Because of the sanctity we hold for 
jurors and deliberations, no one really knows just how bad the problem is. 
See Paul Grewal,former N.D. Cal. Magistrate Judge, Keynote Address at Stanford Law School: Scientific 
Evidence on Trial: Time to Get Real, Patent Law in Global Perspective Conference (Oct. 20, 2017). 
 14. See Alsup, supra note 1. 
 15. See, e.g., Matthias Gafni & John Woolfolk, Federal judge asks PG&E: Should I ‘let you keep 
killing people?’ Rules utility violated its felony probation—U.S. District Judge William Alsup spent 
Wednesday morning eviscerating PG&E in federal court over wildfires, THE MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/01/30/federal-judge-to-decide-whether-to-toughen-pges-
probation-terms-today/; Chloe Cornish, Judge hearing Uber-Waymo case throws sand in Silicon Valley’s 
gears, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3d4cb174-d636-11e7-a303-
9060cb1e5f44. 
 16. For example, Judge Alsup learned the Java programming language in order to understand the 
issues driving the Oracle v. Google litigation. See Jeong, supra note 2; Farber, supra note 4. 
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management approaches.17 His essay offers insights about the evolution of 
patent litigation in the digital age and explains his blunt “showdown” 
procedure,18 inspired by the western classic, Gunfight at the O.K. Corral.19 
For those who did not grow up on western film classics, Gunfight at the 
O.K. Corral chronicles the notorious gunfight between lawmen and outlaws 
on October 26, 1881, in Tombstone, Arizona Territory. 20  The gunfight 
epitomizes the danger and lawlessness of the western frontier where 
marauding bandits wreaked havoc on those seeking to develop the west. The 
dramatic showdown at the O.K. Corral was the culmination of a feud 
between the outlaw “Cowboys” (Billy Claiborne, Ike and Billy Clanton, and 
Tom and Frank McLaury) and the lawmen (Marshal Virgil Earp and his 
associates, Morgan Earp, Special Policeman Wyatt Earp, and temporary 
policeman Doc Holliday). Billy Clanton and the McLaury brothers were 
killed. Ike Clanton, Billy Claiborne, and Wes Fuller ran from the fight. Virgil 
and Morgan Earp and Doc Holliday were wounded. Wyatt Earp was 
unharmed and would later exact revenge. The story can be seen as a turning 
point in the settling of the west. The Earps and Doc Holliday stood up to the 
Cowboys in support of the community and the rule of law. 
In the modern patent showdown playing out at the N.D. C[orr]al, Judge 
Alsup is not a combatant like Marshal Earp but rather a neutral jurist seeking 
to resolve complex and potentially costly disputes between patent owners 
and technology companies. The “showdown” metaphor suggests that a new 
breed of marauders—non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) armed with vast 
portfolios of vague, overbroad, and dubious patent claims—seeks to 
shakedown technology companies through the threat and pursuit of costly 
litigation. As reflected in the first and last paragraphs of his essay—sharing 
his view that software patents are a “plague on innovation”21—”Sheriff” 
Alsup would, if left to his own devices, be inclined to take extreme measures 
against the digital patent marauders. But constrained as he is as “just a lowly 
 
 17. See, e.g., Ginny LaRoe, For Oracle, Google Lawyers, a Trial by Fire, THE RECORDER (Sept. 
16, 2011) (observing that Judge “Alsup has become something of an innovator in patent litigation. In 
recent years, he’s employed all sorts of methods designed to make what he calls the ‘bone crushing’ parts 
go more smoothly—at least for him. The Oracle case, in which the company claims Google’s Android 
mobile operating system violates the Java-related patents and copyrights it acquired when it bought Sun 
Microsystems Inc., may be Alsup’s boldest experiment yet.”). 
 18. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 116. 
 19. See id. at 122; GUNFIGHT AT THE O.K. CORRAL (Paramount Pictures 1957). 
 20. See GUNFIGHT AT THE O.K. CORRAL, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunfight_at_the_O.K._Corral. 
 21. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 124. 
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district judge”22 by other law enforcement institutions—the Patent Office, 
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court—“Sheriff” Alsup aims to keep 
the peace on the Silicon Valley frontier through swift and efficient case 
management. 23  In that sense, Judge Alsup, like Marshal Earp, seeks to 
promote peace, tranquility, and the rule of law in the west. 
Judge Alsup began roaming Silicon Valley long before NPEs rode into 
town.24 In those bygone days, patents played a different role than in the 
digital age. Innovative companies invested substantial resources to solve 
complex technological problems like squeezing thousands of transistors onto 
miniscule silicon wafers.25 Electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, and 
materials scientists in those days would have sneered at patenting one-click 
ordering to automate shopping 26  or simulating a slide-to-unlock icon to 
prevent butt calls. 27  When arduous research and testing produced a 
significant breakthrough, companies applied for and obtained a patent. For 
about 17 years thereafter, the patentee could run any intellectual property 
raider out of N.D. Cal. (and the rest of the U.S. of A.) by asserting its patent. 
The litigation was relatively straightforward.28 The patentee asserted one or 
a few patent claims. A judge, rather than a jury, typically heard the case. And 
the matter was efficiently resolved. 
 
 22. See id. at 111. 
 23. See id. (stating that “I do follow the law. If I don’t agree with a decision by the Federal Circuit, 
too bad for me; I follow it anyway because I took an oath to follow the law. I try to be fair to both sides 
even if I think one of them is a total abuse of the system.”). 
 24. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
 25. See TRANSISTOR COUNT, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor_count. Companies like Intel 
relied on patenting their innovations to propel Moore’s law. The latest chips now hold billions of 
transistors.  See TRANSISTOR COUNT, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor_count. 
 26. See U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, Method and System for Placing a Purchase via a 
Communications Network (Sept. 28, 1999) (issued to Amazon.com); Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction), 
vacated and remanded, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Troy Wolverton, Amazon, Barnes&Noble settle 
patent suit, CNET (Mar. 6, 2002), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-854105.html. The European patent 
application was rejected. See Tim Worstall, Amazon Loses 1-Click Patent, FORBES (July 7, 2011), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/07/07/amazon-loses-1-click-patent. 
 27. See U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721, Unlocking a Device by Performing Gestures on an Unlock Image 
(Oct. 25, 2011) (issued to Apple, Inc.). The Federal Circuit vacillated on whether Apple’s slide-to-unlock 
invention was patent-worthy. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 816 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(holding slide-to-unlock patent obvious); rev’d 839 F.3d 1034, 1047–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(finding slide-to-unlock to be nonobvious); but see id. at 1064–70 (Prost, C.J., dissenting); 1074–85 (Dyk, 
J. dissenting); id. at 1087–89 (Reyna, J. dissenting); see also Richard Beem, Stephan Freischem, Martin 
Hemmer & Jonathan Moss, The Slide to Unlock Patent: A Jurisdictional Comparison, AIPPI (June 18, 
2018) (reporting that the slide-to-unlock patent was determined to be invalid in Germany, United 
Kingdom, and The Netherlands as obvious), https://aippi.org/no-show/the-slide-to-unlock-patent-a-
jurisdictional-comparison/. 
 28. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 112 Fig. 2. 
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The digital revolution brought new challenges to patent case 
management. Section A summarizes the background for understanding the 
showdown method. Section B reviews the patent case management prior art. 
Section C discloses the details of Judge Alsup’s method for improving case 
management. Section D assesses whether it works for its intended purposes. 
A. Background of the Invention 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was initially 
skeptical of software patents. 29  As software technology emerged in the 
1960s, the PTO denied patent protection for computer software under the 
“mental steps” doctrine, a rule that excluded processes that could be carried 
out through a series of mental steps. 30  Bureaucratic concerns about the 
challenges posed by processing a deluge of software applications for which 
prior art was scattered 31  and political crossfire between vested patent 
constituencies32 led to the PTO to oppose eligibility for computer software.33 
In 1968, the Patent Office rejected a patent application for a method of 
converting “binary coded decimal” numerical information into binary 
number signals as ineligible.34 On appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, Judge Giles Rich reversed the PTO’s rejection and held that the 
claims covered machine-implemented processes and apparatuses, such as 
“cash registers, bookkeeping machines and adding machines” which have 
always been eligible for patent protection.35 The Supreme Court reversed.36 
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas reasoned that allowing protection for 
the claimed invention was tantamount to patenting an idea and would “would 
wholly preempt the mathematical formula and, in practical effect, would be 
a patent of the algorithm itself.”37 The Court reinforced this ruling six years 
 
 29. See Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 8, at 1347–49. 
 30. See, e.g., In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 379–83 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (rejecting an application 
claims mathematical means to determine optimal profile of airfoil). 
 31. See Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret 
Law, 28 IDEA 13, 14–15 (1987). 
 32. See Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 
JURIMETRICS J. 339, 349 (1983). 
 33. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO 
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 20–21 (1966). 
 34. See Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 315,050. 
 35. See Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (referring to Board of Appeals 
of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 315,050). 
 36. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 37. Id. at 71–72. 
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later in Parker v. Flook,38 holding that algorithms as part of process claims 
must be considered as if it were part of the prior art. Therefore, the claim is 
patent eligible only if there is some other “inventive concept in its 
application.”39 
The Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr,40 however, 
opened the door for software patents. The Court concluded that “a physical 
and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products 
[encompassing the use of computer software and an algorithm] falls within 
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” 41  Justice 
Rehnquist purported to distinguish Benson and Flook before proclaiming 
that “[o]ur earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a 
claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become 
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer 
program, or digital computer.”42 The Court emphasized that process claims 
are properly analyzed  
 
as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new 
elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the 
analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new 
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the 
constituents of the combination were well known and in common use 
before the combination was made. The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps 
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining 
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of 
possibly patentable subject matter.43 
 
In so holding, Justice Rehnquist effectively overruled Flook’s 
requirement of inventive application. He reiterated, however, that “a 
mathematical formula as such” is not patentable nor is limiting the use of a 
formula to a particular technological environment. 44  The touchstone for 
patentability of a process embodying a mathematical formula, according to 
the Court, is significant post-solution activity—i.e., “transforming or 
reducing an article to different state or thing.”45 
 
 38. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).  
 39. Id. at 594. 
 40. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 41. Id. at 184. 
 42. Id. at 187. 
 43. Id. at 188–89. 
 44. Id. at 191. 
 45. Id. at 191–92. 
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Notwithstanding the Diehr ruling, most of the emerging software 
industry did not initially choose the patent protection path. Even Xerox 
Corporation, which had built its plain paper copier empire on patent 
protection, 46  did not patent many of its fundamental software advances 
relating to microcomputers, graphical user interface technology, and 
networking. Nor did it aggressively enforce the computer-related patents that 
it obtained.47 
The relatively open software technology landscape enabled Apple, Sun, 
Microsoft, Cisco, and other emerging technology companies to build their 
technological outposts on the digital frontier without having to navigate a 
patent minefield. Trade secret and copyright protection, rather than patent 
law, served as the principal forms of intellectual property protection for 
computer software during this formative era.48 The software industry moved 
quickly, and companies did not see much advantage in pursuing software 
patent protection.49 
The computer-related patent landscape brightened by the mid-1980s. 
Congress established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982 for the express purpose of “ending the current legal confusion created 
 
 46. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (highlighting Xerox’s large patent portfolio). 
 47. See Malcolm Gladwell, Creation Myth: Xerox, Apple, and the Truth about Innovation, THE 
NEW YORKER (May 16, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/creation-myth; 
MICHAEL HILTZIK, DEALERS OF LIGHTNING: XEROX PARC AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE 
329–45, 389–98 (2000); see also John Markoff, Even Sun Microsystems Had Its Roots at Xerox PARC, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014) (reporting that one of Sun’s founders modeled Sun’s workstation on Xerox’s 
Alto computer system using less expensive, off-the-shelf parts; and that Microsoft’s Word and Office 
suite traces back to a Xerox memo), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/even-sun-microsystems-
had-its-roots-at-xerox-parc/; Greg Satell, How PARC Saved Xerox, FORBES (May 21, 2015) (noting that 
Xerox PARC spawned Adobe and 3Com), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2015/03/21/how-
parc-saved-xerox/#56bdbe391f52; The History of PostScript, PREPRESSUE.COM (Feb. 11, 2017) 
(describing how Adobe was formed to commercialize “Interpress,” a language developed by John 
Warnock, a Xerox PARC engineer, to control laser printing; after Xerox declined to pursue the project, 
Warnock and his boss formed Adobe and developed PostScript), 
https://www.prepressure.com/postscript/basics/history. 
 48. See Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 8, at 1349–51.  
 49. See id. at 1346–47, 1351; Glenn J. MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software—An Update 
and Practical Synthesis, 20 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1063–64 (1983); Robert Greene Sterne et al., The 2005 
U.S. Patent Landscape for Electronic Companies, in Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series: 
Annual Institute on Computer & Internet Law, at 3 (2005) (“The 1980s saw an amazing business 
phenomena in the U.S. of creation of many start up electronic companies, some of which broke out of the 
pack of their competitors to become very large companies in their own right. Notable examples are Apple, 
Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, Sun, [and] AOL . . . . As upstarts, these companies in general did not embrace 
patents in the slightest.”) [hereinafter 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape]; cf. KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID 
KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 41–42 (2000) 
(suggesting ignorance of patent law and antipathy towards software patents as among the reasons 
companies did not pursue them). 
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by eleven different appellate forums, all generating different interpretations 
of the patent law.”50 The Federal Circuit, which merged experienced, pro-
patent judges from the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (most 
notably Judge Rich) with the appellate division of the U.S. Court of Claims, 
set about broadening and strengthening patent protection.51 
The software patent tide shifted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Texas 
Instruments (“TI”) and IBM, the aging computer device and hardware giants 
that had been actively patenting a wide range of computer-related inventions, 
looked to monetize these investments as upstart microcomputer and software 
businesses were supplanting their product revenue streams. 52  TI initially 
went to court: the U.S. International Trade Commission53 and E.D. Tex.54 
 
 50. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307 (1980) (commenting on the legislation that would become the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25); see also COMM’N ON 
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 15, as reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220–21 (1975) (quoting Judge 
Henry Friendly describing “mad and undignified races between a patentee who wishes to sue for 
infringement in one circuit believed to be benign toward patents, and a user who wants to obtain a 
declaration of invalidity or noninfringement in one believed to be hostile to them”) (citing HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973)); see generally Peter S. Menell, API 
Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1578–81 (2016) (discussing the legislative history behind the establishment 
of the Federal Circuit). 
 51. See Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-
1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 154–55 (1995) (finding that the Federal Circuit was significantly more likely 
to affirm judgments in favor of patent owners than accused infringers); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. 
Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (concluding 
that the Federal Circuit’s behavior was “arguably consistent with standard accounts of capture of 
regulatory processes by well-represented interest groups”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003) (characterizing the Federal 
Circuit as predictably “pro-patent”); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (reporting that findings of patent validity 
have increased since the establishment of the Federal Circuit); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
 52. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 304–06 (2010). 
 53. In February 1986, Texas Instruments filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade 
Commission against 19 chip manufacturers alleging that they had violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, by importing into and selling in the United States computer components that 
infringed 10 of TI’s patents. The Commission instituted an investigation of the complaint.  During the 
ensuing Commission proceedings, 17 of the 19 respondents either settled with TI or the investigation was 
terminated with respect to them. See In the Matter of Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories 
Components Thereof, and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-242 (1986); Certain Dynamic 
Random Access Memories, Etc., USITC Pub. 2034, Inv. No. 337–TA–242 (Nov. 1987), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, and vacated in part, Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 54. See Thomas C. Hayes, Texas Instruments Is Suing 5 Chip Makers Over a Patent, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 10, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/10/business/texas-instruments-is-suing-5-chip-
makers-over-a-patent.html; Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, How TI’s Discovery Transformed the Eastern 
District, TEXAS LAWYER (Oct. 24, 2011) (reporting that in the early 1990s, “Texas Instruments devised 
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These efforts produced a robust patent licensing revenue stream.55  IBM 
pursued licensing directly.56 It also used the pressure of litigation.57 
Meanwhile, at the upstart end of the computer industry, Stac 
Electronics, a small software developer, sued software industry titan 
Microsoft for infringement of data compression technology patents in 
1993.58 After a Los Angeles jury awarded Stac $120 million, the software 
industry took notice.59 
 
a moneymaking litigation strategy intended to ensure customers renewed their licensing agreements with 
the Dallas-based tech company or face a patent infringement suit. And where better to file those suits than 
the Eastern District, where cases went to trial in months instead of years, due to a small number of criminal 
cases on the district’s docket?”); see also Tex. Instruments v. Hyundai Elecs. Indust., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893 
(E.D. Tex. 1999); Tex. Instruments v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., 42 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Texas 
Instruments, Hyundai Settle Dispute With $1 Billion Agreement, INDUSTRYWEEK (Jan. 13, 2005), 
https://www.industryweek.com/archive/texas-instruments-hyundai-settle-dispute-1-billion-agreement. 
 55. See Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Joint Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 653 (Feb. 28, 2002), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf [hereinafter FTC/DOJ Hearings] (statement of Fred 
Telecky, Senior Vice President and General Patent Counsel, Texas Instruments, Inc.) (describing TI’s 
enforcement campaign against foreign semiconductor manufacturers that led to its patent licensing 
program); RIVETTE AND KLINE, supra note 49, at 125 (“Texas Instruments . . . was reportedly saved from 
bankruptcy in the mid-1980s by an all-out patent licensing and litigation effort. In 1992 alone, TI earned 
$391 million from patent licenses—43 more than its $274 million in operating income for that year. Its 
current licensing revenues are thought to be about $800 million a year. All told, analysts estimate that TI 
has earned more than $4 billion in royalties since it began enforcing its patents in the mid-1980s.” 
(footnote omitted)); FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD’S 
TECHNOLOGY 115–23 (Wiley 1994); 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape, supra note 49, at 4. 
 56. See MARSHALL PHELPS & DAVID KLINE, BURNING THE SHIPS: TRANSFORMING YOUR 
COMPANY’S CULTURE THROUGH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY 17–32 (Wiley 2009); JULIE L. 
DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING COMPANIES REALIZE 
VALUE FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS 80–81 (Wiley 2001); Michael Miller, Microsoft to Pay a 
Patent Fee in IBM Accord, WALL. ST. J. B1 (June 29, 1992) (reporting that as part of the Microsoft/IBM 
divorce over PC operating systems, Microsoft paid IBM a one-time fee estimated to be $20-30 million to 
license IBM’s portfolio of more than 1,000 software-related patents); Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, 
FORBES (June 24, 2002) (recounting how IBM was able to extract upwards of $20 million from Sun 
Microsystems for seven patents of questionable validity), 
https://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html. 
 57. See Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Sues Amazon.com over Patents, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/technology/24amazon.html; see also Anne Broache & Dawn 
Kawamoto, Amazon Pays $40 Million to Settle Patent Dispute, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2005), http:// 
news.com.com/Amazon+pays+40+million+to+settle+patent+dispute/2100-1030_3-5829193.html 
(settling lawsuits relating to e-commerce patents). 
 58. See PHELPS AND KLINE, supra note 56, at 12–14 (explaining that Microsoft had invented around 
Stac’s original patent, but that Stac had also acquired a second data compression patent for $250,000 that 
proved critical to its infringement suit). 
 59. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Loses Case on Patent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/24/business/microsoft-loses-case-on-patent.html; Amy Harmon, 
Microsoft Loses Patent Lawsuit, Must Pay Rival $120 Million, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1994), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-02-24/business/fi-26671_1_software-patent; see also Ed Scannell & 
Stuart J. Johnston, Patents may be key to survival, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 7, 1994) (quoting Gary Clow, 
Stac’s President and CEO: “I think we have shown a prototype for how small, innovative companies can 
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As a result of these developments, software companies began 
developing their own patent portfolios primarily for defensive purposes.60 
Software patents were popping up all over the software innovation frontier. 
As the Internet emerged in the mid-1990s, venture capitalists came to see 
software and business method patents as a useful tool for screening start-up 
investments. 61  By that time, the Federal Circuit had liberalized patent 
eligibility standards for software,62 and the Patent Office had come to view 
software patents more favorably.63 Software, Internet, and mobile start-ups, 
as well as established technology companies, flooded the Patent Office with 
all manner of computer-related patent applications. And then in 1998, the 
 
compete . . . . We have shown the way for securing patents for intellectual property against a very strong 
competitor.”). 
 60. See PHELPS AND KLINE , supra note 56, at 40; Chien, supra note 52, at 308–09, 321–22; Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31–43 (2005) (discussing a 
wide range of benefits associated with developing large and diverse patent portfolios); 2005 U.S. Patent 
Landscape, supra note 49, at 3–4; The Evolving IP Marketplace: The Operation of IP Markets: Hearing 
Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n 82 (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/mar18/090318transcript.pdf (statement of Russ Slifer, 
Chief Patent Counsel, Micron Technologies, Inc.) (“[In the] late ‘70s, early ‘80s, we were somewhat late 
to the game . . . . There was already an awful lot of innovation from Texas Instruments, IBM and others 
in a large patent portfolio, so we found ourselves in a position where[,] to be able to participate in the 
industry, we had to pay license fees to those companies, and we did so. As we were paying those fees and 
innovating our own technology, we sought our own patent portfolio as the technology advanced.  We 
acquired a fairly substantial patent portfolio based on strong innovation, which allowed us to enter into 
cross-licensing agreements with other manufacturers.”); FTC/DOJ Hearings, supra note 55, at 674 
(statement of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) 
(testifying that “[b]etween 1984 and [19]93, the first [ten] years of the company, [Cisco] filed only one 
patent. . . . [In] 1994 the company had grown to over [$1 billion] in annual revenue. This growth was 
obviously not fuelled [sic] by patents, it was fuelled [sic] by competition and by open, nonproprietary 
interfaces. But in 1994, the company . . . [started] a program to obtain more patents. . . . We filed six 
patents in 1994. . . . We increased each year . . . [and] we’re now [in 2002] filing over [750] patents a 
year.”). 
 61. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 651, 653 (2002); Bronwyn H. Hall 
& Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. 
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 104 (2001) (finding that start-ups are more 
eager to obtain patents than are established firms); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of 
Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1505–06 (noting that “venture capitalists use 
client patents (or more likely, patent applications) as evidence that the company is well managed, is at a 
certain stage in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche”); Samuel Kortum & Josh 
Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 689 (2000) 
(suggesting “a strong relationship between venture capital (funding) and patenting”); David L. Hayes, 
What the General Intellectual Property Practitioner Should Know about Patenting Business Methods, 16 
COMPUT. LAWYER 3, 4 (Oct 1999) (“Patent protection is increasingly a factor that investors such as 
venture capitalists consider in deciding whether to invest in a company, especially in its early stages.”). 
 62. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Rich, J.) (holding that the display 
of data on a computer screen constituted sufficient post-solution activity to establish patent eligibility). 
 63. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related 
Inventions, 61 FED. REG. 7478 (Feb. 28, 1996) (implementing the principles reflected in the Alappat 
decision). 
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Federal Circuit opened the patent floodgates in State Street Bank and Trust 
Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,64 by ruling that any business 
method was eligible for patent protection so long as it produced a “useful, 
concrete and tangible result.” Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was 
inattentive to this development and allowed a deeply flawed decision to 
stand.65 
The patent acquisition race was on. Software companies big and small 
were acquiring software patents on all aspects of e-commerce and software.66 
Many of these patents were hastily and loosely drafted to reduce costs and 
provide flexibility. They were seen primarily as defensive assets—available 
to cross-license should IBM or another patentee with a large portfolio come 
knocking.67 
The proliferation of software patents in the mid to late 1990s did not 
initially generate patent litigation. Rather it promoted the flow of venture 
capital into the dot-com sector as well as licensing activity. The NASDAQ 
stock index—which tracks many Silicon Valley companies—skyrocketed 
five-fold from 1995 to early 2000. But on March 11, 2000, the tech bubble 
burst. The NASDAQ plummeted by more than half by year-end and 
continued to drop to nearly its 1995 level by late 2001. Venture capital 
investment quickly dried up, and many of the dot-com companies went 
bankrupt, leaving only Herman Miller Aeron chairs and software patents as 
their principal assets. Bankruptcy trustees quickly auctioned off these assets 
at bargain basement prices and a new breed of patent owners bought them 
up. Around that time, Nathan Myhrvold, Microsoft’s former Chief 
Technology Officer, co-founded Intellectual Ventures with the aim of 
 
 64. 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 65. St. Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (denying 
petition for writ of certiorari; noting that Justice Breyer took no part in the decision). 
 66. See, e.g., Ina Fried, Gates wants patent power: Can Microsoft win itself 3,000 patents this year? 
The answer could have an effect on its bottom line., CNET (July 29, 2004), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/gates-wants-patent-power/. 
 67. See Scott Herhold, Patent War, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 18, 1999) (quoting a venture 
capitalist as saying, “[n]one of my companies seek patent protection because they actually think it will 
protect them from competition . . . [r]ather, they seek patents to protect themselves from other people 
who have patents”); Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, supra note 61, at 143 
(“One of the major reasons that companies get patents is that they’re afraid that their competitors have 
them, and they don’t want to be the only one left who doesn’t have the ability to play in this game.”). 
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building and monetizing a vast patent portfolio. 68  These new-age patent 
enterprises launched assertion campaigns to profit from these assets.69 
The bursting of the dot-com bubble opened a new wild west in which a 
fearless breed of patent owners, non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), wielding 
patent portfolios with hundreds of claims came to N.D. Cal. Like landmines, 
these patents were difficult to trace. The Patent Office records were not 
easily accessible at that time, and start-ups were focused on speed to market, 
not due diligence or rights clearance. And like digital barbed wire, they 
fenced off parts of the frontier. Further complicating the terrain, there 
remained serious questions about the validity and scope of such patents.70 
At first, these patentees could credibly threaten to enjoin technology 
products and services. Successful plaintiffs were nearly assured of injunctive 
relief at that time,71 striking fear in the hearts of Silicon Valley general 
 
 68. See Nathan Myhrvold, Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Myhrvold#Intellectual_Ventures; Intellectual Ventures, 
Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_Ventures. Somewhat ironically, Peter Detkin, who 
coined the term “patent troll” while serving as Intel’s Assistant General Counsel in Charge of Patent 
Litigation, Licensing, and Antitrust, co-founded Intellectual Ventures. See Roger Kay, Where did the 
Patent Troll Narrative Come From?, MEDIUM (Feb. 12, 2018) (reporting that while at Intel and frustrated 
by the rising tide of patent cases that the company had to defend, Detkin came up with the term “patent 
troll” to describe “somebody who tries to make a lot of money from a patent that they are not practicing, 
have no intention of practicing, and in most cases never practiced”), 
https://medium.com/@rogerkay/where-did-the-patent-troll-narrative-come-from-301b20072dac; see 
also Mike Masnick, This American Life Followup on Patents Reveals Intellectual Ventures Is Even 
Slimier Than Previously Believed, TECHDIRT (June 3, 2013), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130603/11295023297/this-american-life-followup-patents-reveals-
intellectual-ventures-is-even-slimier-than-previously-believed.shtml. 
 69. See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011) 
(Drummond is Google Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer) (asserting that “[a] smartphone 
might involve as many as 250,000 (largely questionable) patent claims”); Joe Mullin, Patent war goes 
nuclear: Microsoft, Apple-owned “Rockstar” sues Google: Rockstar paid $4.5 billion for Nortel patents 
and has launched a major attack, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/10/patent-war-goes-nuclear-microsoft-apple-owned-rockstar-sues-google/. 
 70. See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 2–4, 18–21 (2013). 
 71. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing the 
general rule and reversing the district court’s denial of permanent injunctive relief), vacated, 547 U.S. 
388 (2006); Tristrata Tech., Inc. v. Mary Kay, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (D. Del. 2006) (same); 
Century Wrecker Corp. v. E.R. Buske Mfg. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1256, 1924 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); 
Hesston Corp. v. Sloop, 734 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D. Kan. 1990) (same); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 
868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (characterizing issuance of a permanent injunction following a 
finding a patent infringement as the “general rule” and reversing the district court’s denial of permanent 
injunctive relief); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (observing that 
“the right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property”). Only in rare 
circumstances did the courts not order a permanent injunction following a finding of patent infringement. 
See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (reversing the 
granting of an injunction that an injunction “would close the sewage plant, leaving the entire community 
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counsels. Unless their clients could obtain summary judgment, the risk of an 
injunction was often too great to bear. 72  Many technology companies 
reluctantly settled these cases rather than go to trial. Moreover, just the cost 
of discovery and adverse publicity could force defendants to the negotiating 
table. Technology start-ups pursuing initial public offerings could not risk 
the dark cloud of patent exposure, and many quietly cut deals with “patent 
trolls.” 
As noted earlier, the N.D. Cal. jurists came to see early case 
management—careful claim construction and summary judgment73—as a 
means for weeding out the more questionable claims and preventing NPEs 
from railroading technology companies into a settlement. These efforts led 
many NPEs to look elsewhere, and with the Federal Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of the patent venue, they headed to more trial-oriented venues, 
notably E.D. Va.’s “rocket docket,” D. Del., and, especially, E.D. Tex.74 
Some practicing technology companies came to see patent licensing as 
not just a critical line of defense,75  but also a necessary and, for some, 
promising offensive business strategy.76 In 2003, Bill Gates lured Marshall 
Phelps, the architect of IBM’s patent licensing campaign, out of retirement 
 
without any means for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby 
polluting its waters and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining communities”).  
 72. David V. Radack, Patent Trolls: Pay up or Fight?, 8 LAW. J. 3, 3 (2006) (reporting that Research 
in Motion settled an NPE patent infringement suit brought by NTP, Inc. for $612.5 million in order to 
avoid a permanent injunction shutting down the Blackberry service, which, at the time, had over four 
million U.S. subscribers); Press Release, Research in Motion, Research in Motion and NTP Sign 
Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.marketwired.com/press-
release/research-in-motion-and-ntp-sign-definitive-settlement-agreement-to-end-litigation-nasdaq-
rimm-582911.htm. 
 73. See PCMJG3d, supra note 12, at Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6.  
 74. See Melissa Repko, How Patent Suits Shaped a Small East Texas Town Before Supreme 
Court’’s Ruling, DALL. NEWS (May 23, 2017) (reporting that “Marshall may be a small town in far East 
Texas, but in the world of patent litigation, it has been a giant.”), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/technology/2017/05/24/east-texas-supreme-court-ruling-setback-
towns-final-verdict-locals-say; Susan Decker, Texas District Is Heaven for Patent Holders Under Siege, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES (May 1, 2006), 
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2002963706_btpatentheaven01.html; Daniel 
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 265–70 (2016); Ryan Davis, Delaware 
Patent Suits Dwindle as Plaintiffs Flock to EDTX, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/756753/delaware-patent-suits-dwindle-as-plaintiffs-flock-to-edtx; 
Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J. 1, 1–3 (2007) (noting that several district courts have “hung out a welcome sign for patent cases by 
expressing interest in the cases, forming advisory committees, or adopting local rules”).  
 75. See generally James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 
(2015). 
 76. See 2005 U.S. Patent Landscape, supra note 49, at 7–14. 
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to transform Microsoft’s intellectual property strategy.77 Phelps oversaw a 
multi-faceted approach, including massive software patent acquisition, 
strategic partnerships, and targeted patent assertion. 78  Microsoft also 
invested in Intellectual Ventures to further hedge its business strategy.79 
The publicity surrounding patent trolls awakened the most powerful 
lawmen and lawwomen in the land to the dangers of the patent frontier. After 
missing a prime opportunity to head patent bandits off at the pass in State 
Street Bank and Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,80 the 
Supreme Court raised the bar for obtaining injunctive relief in 2006.81 A year 
later, the Court pushed back on the Federal Circuit’s rigid non-obvious 
standard for invalidating patents.82 The Federal Circuit also became alarmed 
by the potential for excessive patent awards.83 
 
 77. See Microsoft Appoints Marshall Phelps Corporate Vice President And Deputy General 
Counsel for Intellectual Property, MICROSOFT (June 5, 2003), 
https://news.microsoft.com/2003/06/05/microsoft-appoints-marshall-phelps-corporate-vice-president-
and-deputy-general-counsel-for-intellectual-property/; PHELPS AND KLINE, supra note 56, at 1–3. 
 78. See PHELPS AND KLINE, supra note 56, at 6–9, 16–19, 33–65. 
 79. See PHELPS AND KLINE, supra note 56, at 15; Taylor Soper, Intellectual Ventures Gets 
Investment from Microsoft While Apples Stays Away, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 11, 2014, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.geekwire.com/2014/apple-microsoft-patent/. 
 80. See 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
 81. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (ruling that the granting of 
permanent injunctions following a finding of patent infringement should not be automatic; rather the 
patentee bears the burden of showing the balance of the following four factors weigh in its favor: (1) 
irreparable harm; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for the harm caused by 
infringement; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction). 
On remand, the district court denied injunctive relief to MercExchange, an NPE, and instead ordered 
monetary damages of $30 million. See Mylene Mangalindan, EBay Is Ordered To Pay $30 Million In 
Patent Rift, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119751056840625503.  
 82. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 83. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (raising the bar for 
proving enhanced damages), overruled, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); 
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (invigorating the trial court’s 
gatekeeping role in scrutinizing damages experts); LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 
F.3d 51, 67–68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that use of the “entire market value” as a royalty base is a 
“narrow exception” to general apportionment rule when claims are drawn to an individual component of 
a multicomponent product; patentee can recover “damages as a percentage of revenues or profits 
attributable to the entire product” only when the patentee can show that the “patented feature drives the 
demand for an entire multi-component product”); see also VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 
1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (requiring apportionment to be scaled to the “smallest saleable patent-
practicing unit”). 
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The escalating costs of acquiring84 and maintaining85 patent portfolios 
gradually took a financial toll on technology companies that had invested 
heavily in building defensive portfolios. Some of these firms looked for ways 
to capitalize on these investments. 86  In 2010, Micron Technology, a 
successful semiconductor manufacturing company, spun out much of its 
portfolio of 4,500 patents for memory chip technology, directory assistance 
capability, image chips, and other smartphone-related features, to Round 
Rock Research for exploiting the value of these patents. Micron persuaded 
John Desmarais, a prominent patent litigator who had built his reputation 
defending against NPE lawsuits, to lead Round Rock Research.87  When 
Micron owned these patents, it could not credibly assert them against 
competitors without triggering patent infringement counterclaims. As an 
NPE, however, Round Rock Research could freely assert these patents 
against Micron’s competitors as well as other technology firms without any 
risk of retaliation.88 Micron reserved licenses for itself, and hence was not at 
risk, yet it profited from Round Rock Research’s enforcement and licensing 
activities. 
Soon after its creation, Round Rock Research asserted smartphone 
technology patents against HTC in D. Del.89 In addition, Desmarais LLP 
brought infringement actions in E.D. Tex. on behalf of Intellectual 
Ventures.90 With the enforcement threat established, Desmarais pursued a 
successful licensing campaign that brought Apple, Nokia, Samsung, Sony, 
and other technology companies to the table.91 
 
 84. The typical fee for prosecuting a relatively complex electrical/computer patent runs about 
$10,000. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2015 29 (June 2015). In addition, prosecuting patents imposes direct costs on technology 
companies, most notably the imposition on scientist/engineer time.   
 85. See USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-
payment/uspto-fee-schedule. The PTO has escalating fees to maintain patents of $1,600 (3.5 years), 
$3,600 (7.5 years), and $7,400 (at 11.5 years). Small and micro entities receive 50 percent and 75 percent 
discounts, respectively. See Entity Status for Fee Purposes, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
application-process/applying-online/entity-status-fee-purposes. 
 86. See Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577514782932390996; Chien, supra note 
52. 
 87. Zach Lowe, John Desmarais Takes His First Shot as a Patent Owner, THE AMLAW DAILY (Oct. 
4, 2010), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/10/desmaraiscase.html. 
 88. See Lowe, supra note 87; see also David Bario, John Desmarais’s Round Rock Research Is 
Selling ‘Covenants Not to Sue’ at an Upcoming Auction, CORPORATECOUNSEL (Mar. 10, 2011) (reporting 
Round Rock Research, would auction off four lots of “covenants not to sue” at an upcoming IP acution). 
 89. See Ryan Davis, HTC Sued by Ex-Kirkland Partner’s Patent-Holding Co., LAW360 (Oct. 4, 
2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/198549. 
 90. See Bario, supra note 88. 
 91. See id. 
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As patent litigation skyrocketed,92 and threats of injunctions, outsize 
verdicts, 93  and eye-popping settlements 94  galvanized the business 
community, the Supreme Court increased its policing on the patent frontier.95 
The Court restricted patent eligibility, although its analysis has produced a 
doctrinal morass.96 Most recently, the Supreme Court loosened the standard 
for awarding attorneys’ fees in patent cases,97 which moderately increases 
 
 92. See USPTO, The Drastic Rise in Patent Litigation, USPTO (2000-2015) (observing that patent 
case filings in U.S. district courts have been rising at an alarming rate since 2009), 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/economic-research/drastic-rise-patent-
litigation-2000-2015. 
 93. See, e.g., Andrew Longstreth, Federal Circuit Upholds $290 Million Judgment Against 
Microsoft, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Dec. 23, 2009), 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202437219530/?id=1202437219530&slreturn=2019031
1143710. 
 94. See, e.g., Radack, supra note 72 (reporting Research in Motion’s $612.5 million settlement). 
 95. The legislative lawmen and lawwomen also showed interest, but delayed action until after the 
Supreme Court had tackled several of the more controversial issues (remedies and nonobviousness). 
Congress eventually took action in passing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341, which afforded defendants a more reliable system of administrative patent 
review. 
 96. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has had trouble shooting 
straight. It missed a prime opportunity to eliminate business method patents in Bilski, see Menell, Forty 
Years of Wondering in the Wilderness, supra note 11, and then missed the target entirely in Mayo, taking 
out medical diagnostics—an area in which patents could promote progress—based on a misreading of a 
nineteenth century English case. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
565, 580–87 (2015). The Alice decision reinforced the error and the Court again missed a prime 
opportunity to correct the mistake by not granting certiorari in Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. 
See Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin & Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner for 
a Writ of Certiorari at 4–14, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016). The 
Court’s jurisprudence has produced a bewildering body of doctrine that has bedeviled the Federal Circuit, 
Patent Office, and district courts.  See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“I believe the law needs 
clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the 
innovation field consider are § 101 problems.”); Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 
1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s blanket 
dismissal of conventional post-solution steps” bars patent eligibility to Sequenom’s “truly meritorious” 
invention and that the invention at issue would have been valid under the standards reflected in Le Roy 
v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1859)); USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
Guidance, 84 FED. REG. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019); Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Patent Eligibility Angst Spurs Sens. 
Urging Revamp, LAW360 (Feb. 22, 2019) (reporting that “legislators appear ready to put in the work to 
draft legislation that would rewrite the law defining what is eligible for a patent”; noting that Senator 
Coons “indicated that congressional action may be needed due to decisions where Federal Circuit judges 
have recently expressed frustration with the difficulty under current precedent of determining whether an 
invention is patent-eligible under Section 101 of the Patent Act”), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1129865/fed-circ-patent-eligibility-angst-spurs-sens-urging-revamp; 
see generally BCLT 101 Report, supra note 11; John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says 
Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1765 (2014). 
 97. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (holding that “an 
‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a 
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NPEs’ exposure from asserting questionable patents and vexatious litigation 
tactics.98 More significantly, in 2017 the Supreme Court reined in patent 
venue,99 holding that defendants could be sued only where they reside or 
have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established 
place of business.100 This has channeled more patent cases to D. Del., C.D. 
Cal, and the N.D. C[orr]al.101 
B. Patent Case Management Prior Art 
Jurists have long experimented with staging of claims and bellwether 
trials to streamline litigation and promote settlement.102 The patent litigation 
field has been a particularly active and inventive testing ground for such 
techniques. 
Long before the software patent litigation explosion, then-District 
Judge Jon O. Newman successfully used this approach to resolve one 
especially thorny issue in the complex patent-antitrust litigation between 
 
party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated”). The Patent Act provides that the court may award 
attorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party” in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2019). 
 98. See PCMJG3d, supra note 12, at 9-11 – 9-16; Jeffrey D. Mills, Patent Litigation Two Years 
After Octane Fitness: How to Enhance the Prospect of Recovering Attorneys’ Fees, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 27 
(2017) (surveying post-Octane Fitness case law). 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2019). 
 100. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017); see also In re 
Cray, 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see generally J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: 
TC Heartland and the Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569 (2018).  
 101. See Geneva Clark, TC Heartland, Legal Trends, One Year Later, LEX MACHINA BLOG (May 
23, 2018) (reporting that in the year following the TC Heartland decision, 3,936 patent cases were filed, 
with D. Del. receiving 23 percent of filings (907), E.D. Tex. receiving 13 percent (525), C.D. Cal. 
receiving 9 percent (363), and N.D. Cal. receiving 7 percent (295); by contrast, in the year preceding TC 
Heartland, 36 percent (1,627) of patent filings were in E.D. Tex.), https://lexmachina.com/tc-heartland-
legal-trends-one-year-later/. 
   In light of this shift in venue law, Apple has decided to exit E.D. Tex. entirely. See Ryan Davis, Apple 
Shuts Stores In EDTX, But Will Other Cos. Follow?, LAW360 (Feb. 25, 2019) (reporting that “Apple is 
closing its only two retail stores in the Eastern District of Texas, a move widely viewed as a bid to avoid 
being sued in a district where the company has been hit with massive patent verdicts”), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1131879. See VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 748 Fed. Appx. 332 
(Fed. Cir. 2019).  Another E.D. Tex. verdict against Apple for $596 million is currently on appeal. See 
Daniel Siegel, VirnetX Says $93M Added to $503M Verdict in Apple IP Row, LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2018) 
(noting that all four patents asserted in that case have been found invalid in PTAB proceedings), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1085597/virnetx-says-93m-added-to-503m-verdict-in-apple-ip-row. 
According to Lex Machina, Apple has been sued other 250 times in E.D. Tex. since 2009. See Davis, 
supra note 101. 
 102. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008). 
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Xerox Corp. and SCM that unfolded in the late 1970s.103 When that litigation 
arose, Xerox had dominated the plain paper copying industry for two 
decades. After its pioneering innovation in the late 1930s, 104  Xerox 
accumulated thousands of patents on related technologies to make plain 
paper copying less expensive and superior to alternative reprography 
technologies. The SCM antitrust case concerned in part whether Xerox’s 
refusal to license its massive patent portfolio to competitors constituted 
exclusionary conduct proscribed by antitrust law. SCM alleged that many of 
the patents had been obtained merely to block competitors and were not used 
in Xerox’s own products. Thus, the court needed to determine how many of 
Xerox’s 2,200 patents were actually being used in its products.105 
Judge Newman asked counsel to divide the patents into three buckets: 
those being used, those not being used, and those in dispute.106 The attorneys 
reported back that “only” 200 patents were in dispute. As an alternative to 
litigating 200 patents, Judge Newman applied a then-existing obscure 
National Basketball Association rule used to prevent a fouled player from 
faking an injury to enable a better player to take the free throw: the coach of 
the opposing team selects the replacement foul-shooter. As applied to the 
SCM v. Xerox antitrust trial, Judge Newman asked SCM to select what it 
thought were the two patents most clearly not being used (the weakest 
“players” on Xerox’s “team”) and asked Xerox to select the two it thought 
were most clearly being used. The court took testimony on the four patents 
in a mere two days.107 Based on its view of these four patents, the jury found 
that Xerox had not obtained patents primarily to block competitive products, 
which supported the court’s ultimate ruling for Xerox.108 
As the bursting of the dot-com bubble triggered a software patent 
litigation explosion, district judges increasingly faced an onslaught of 
challenging patent cases. Much of the PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT 
JUDICIAL GUIDE focuses on managing these challenges fairly and efficiently. 
The GUIDE recommends that judges surface dispositive issues early in the 
 
 103. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox, Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff’d, on consideration of 
certified questions, as to denial liability for damages, remanded to dismiss claim for equitable relief, 645 
F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).   
 104. See U.S. Patent No. 2,297,691, Electrophotography (issued Oct. 6, 1942). 
 105. See JON O. NEWMAN, BENCHED 119 (2017).  
 106. See id. 
 107. Litigating all 200 disputed patents would have added three months to an already lengthy trial. 
See id. 
 108. See SCM Corp., 463 F. Supp. at 1007; see generally Lisa A. Huestis, Patent and Antitrust Law: 
The Second Circuit Strives Toward Accommodation, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 767 (1982). 
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litigation process and implement staged, tailored case management plans—
including patent, patent claim, and claim construction term winnowing.109 
Most patent-intensive districts have revised their Patent Local Rules to 
require the parties to jointly identify ten terms “likely to be most significant 
to resolving the parties’ dispute, including those terms for which 
construction may be case or claim dispositive” before the Markman 
hearing.110 
In addition, judges have required patentees to winnow the number of 
patent claims asserted to manageable levels. 111  In the most prominent 
example, Judge R. Gary Klausner confronted a consolidated multidistrict 
patent litigation case where the patentee (Ronald A. Katz, Technology 
Licensing LP) asserted 1,975 patent claims from more than a dozen patents 
against 165 defendants in 50 groups of related defendants. As a way of 
reducing the duplicative claims, Judge Klausner ordered the patentee to 
winnow the number of patent claims being asserted—initially requiring 
selection of no more than 40 claims per defendant group, with further 
winnowing down to 16 claims per defendant group following discovery, 
subject to various provisos.112 The Federal Circuit condoned this practice 
provided that the district court’s method for requiring the patentee to select 
claims allowed the patentee the opportunity to add claims that presented 
unique issues as to liability or damages later.113 
 
 109. See PCMJG3d, supra note 12, at § 2.1.3 (Managing Claim Winnowing and Construction of 
Claim Terms); § 2.5 (Case Management Conference); § 2.6 (Salient Early Case-Management Issues) 
(dealing with multi-defendant litigation, early claim construction, patentable subject matter, early motions 
to dismiss indirect liability and willfulness, damage theories, nuisance-value litigation, and proportional 
discover); § 2.7 (Settlement and Mediation); Appendix 2.1 (Initial Case-Management Conference 
Summary Checklist); § 5.1.2.1.3 (Mechanisms for Limiting the Number of Claim Terms to Construe); § 
5.1.2.1.3.1 (Severance Versus Postponement); § 6.1.3 (Recommended Dual-Track Approach to Summary 
Judgment); § 6.2.1 (Issues More Amenable to Summary Judgment); § 8.1.1 (Separate Trials). 
 110. See N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 1-2; see also N.D. Ill. LPR 4.1(b) (requiring parties to limit terms 
submitted for construction to ten, absent a showing of good cause); see generally PCMJG3d, supra note 
12, at § 5.1.2.1.3. 
 111. See, e.g., Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist., 2008 WL 2485426, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. June 13, 2008) (limiting plaintiff to three claims per asserted patent); Fenster Family Patent 
Holdings, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist., 2005 WL 2304190, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 
20, 2005) (limiting plaintiff to ten patent claims and five asserted products).  
 112. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 712 F. Supp.2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 113. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (affirming the district court’s ruling on the motion to sever and stay claims); Jason Rantanen, In re 
Katz: Managing Complex Patent Suits, PATENTLYO (Feb. 21, 2011), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/in-re-katz-managing-complex-patent-suits.html; see also 
Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 437 F. App’x 897, 902–03 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that district court 
did not abuse its discretion by limiting a patentee to fifteen claims because the limit was not “immutable”). 
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In 2013, the Federal Circuit Advisory Council promulgated a general 
framework for streamlining patent cases, reducing the complexity of patent 
cases and litigation costs.114 The Model Order provides a phased process for 
winnowing the number of asserted patent claims: 
 
§ 2. Not later than 40 days after the accused infringer is required to 
produce documents sufficient to show the operation of the accused 
instrumentalities, the patent claimant shall serve a Preliminary Election of 
Asserted Claims, which shall assert no more than ten claims from each 
patent and not more than a total of 32 claims.115 
§ 3. Not later than 28 days after the Court issues its Claim Construction 
Order, the patent claimant shall serve a Final Election of Asserted Claims, 
which shall identify no more than five asserted claims per patent from 
among the ten previously identified claims and no more than a total of 16 
claims.116 
 
The Model Order encourages parties to discuss lower limits based on: 
 
case-specific factors such as commonality among asserted patents, the 
number and diversity of accused products, the complexity of the 
technology, the complexity of the patent claims, and the complexity and 
number of other issues in the case that will be presented to the judge and/or 
jury. In general, the more patents that are in the case, the lower the per-
patent limits should be. The parties shall jointly submit any proposed 
modifications in their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) Discovery 
Plan.117 
C. The Patent Showdown: A Method for Improving Patent Case 
Management 
Judge Alsup came to see the assertion of vast numbers of vague 
software claims as a potentially abusive litigation tactic aimed at raising 
defendants’ costs and extracting unwarranted settlements. 118  He also 
recognized that the complexity and strategic maneuvering surrounding 
patent cases could clog his docket. Judge Alsup developed the showdown 
 
 114. See Model Order Limiting Excess Patent Claims and Prior Art (Fed. Cir. Advisory Council, 
2013), reproduced in PCMJG3d, supra note 12, at 2–12. The Model Order reflects the recommendations 
of the Federal Circuit Advisory Council, but not necessarily the views of all members of the Federal 
Circuit, and is not binding on district courts. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. The Model Order relaxes these limitations when only one patent is asserted, increasing 
the per-patent limits “by 50%, rounding up.” See id. at 2—12, n.1. 
 117. See id. at 2-12 n.1, 2-12 – 2-13. 
 118. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 114–16. 
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procedure as a potent means for winnowing and staging resolution of patent 
infringement claims. 
There is no question that Judge Alsup’s showdown procedure goes well 
beyond prior art claim winnowing, discovery limits, and bellwether trial 
approaches. Nor does Gunfight at the O.K. Corral anticipate the patent 
showdown. Judge Alsup requires the parties to identify early in the litigation 
process the one patent claim that they believe will most favor their side. He 
then affords the parties expedited discovery on those two claims and requires 
them to bring summary judgment motions on the two claims on an expedited 
schedule. The showdown resolves the two claims, either by summary 
judgment or a limited trial. Judge Alsup emphasizes the likely severity of the 
showdown—an injunction (and possibly attorney fees against the defendant) 
if the patentee wins or attorney fees if the defendant prevails. 
Judge Alsup discloses two working examples.119 
1. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc. 
Judge Alsup first unveiled the showdown method in Comcast Cable 
Communications, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc. 120  Comcast filed its declaratory 
judgment action in October 2016. The showdown concluded by August 
2017, with the patentee dismissing its claims.121 
Some background about the parties will put the case and case 
management approach in perspective. The patentee, OpenTV, was founded 
in 1994 as a joint venture between Thomson Consumer Electronics, marketer 
of RCA TVs and digital satellite system decoders, and Sun Microsystems to 
provide an interactive software platform for interactive television systems.122 
 
 119. See USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2164.02 Working Example 
(“Compliance with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) . . . does not turn on whether an 
example is disclosed. An example may be “working” or “prophetic.” A working example is based on 
work actually performed. A prophetic example describes an embodiment of the invention based on 
predicted results rather than work actually conducted or results actually achieved.”). 
 120. See Complaint For Declaratory Judgment Of Patent Noninfringement, Comcast Cable 
Commc’ns, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., 3:16-cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (Document 1); Cara 
Bayles, Frustrated Alsup Orders ‘Shoot Out’ In Comcast’s Patent Row, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/899710/frustrated-alsup-orders-shoot-out-in-comcast-s-patent-row. 
 121. See Stipulation Resolving All Outstanding Issues In Dispute In Pending Case And For Dismissal 
Of All Claims And Counterclaims; Order, Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., 3:16-cv-
06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. (Document 190) Aug. 15, 2017) (order stipulating that OpenTV provides 
Comcast with covenants not to sue on 10 patents, that Comcast will terminate inter partes review 
proceedings (“IPRs”) on two of the patents and will not initiate future IPRs on any of the patents in the 
complaint, and that Comcast will not seek attorneys’ fees or sanctions relating to the N.D. Cal. litigation). 
 122. See Sun Microsystems, Thomason Multimedia Set Commercial Launch for OpenTV, BUSINESS 
WIRE (Apr.4, 1995), http://besser.tsoa.nyu.edu/impact/w95/RN/apr7news/Merc-news-opentv.html; Ira 
Teinowitz, Thomson Touts Interactive TV System, ADAGE (Jan. 16, 1995), 
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It traces its technological roots to the renowned Java programming 
environment. Sun software engineers initially set out to develop a new 
programming language. 123  This project evolved into a programming 
language for digitally controlled consumer products (such as televisions). 
After Sun struggled to commercialize this project, Sun’s team pivoted to 
Java, a programming language for website interactivity.124 
Despite its name, OpenTV commercialized proprietary set-top box 
technology. It developed a range of tools for interface design, interactive 
broadcasting, and advertising delivery. OpenTV emerged as an early leader 
in the interactive broadcasting field. A range of companies licensed its 
technology that bridged the transition from analog to digital television and 
provided tools for interactive broadcasting. As it developed its software 
products, OpenTV sought and acquired numerous patents during and after 
the dot-com bubble.125 Hence, it benefited from the Federal Circuit’s easing 
of patent standards in the 1990s. 
With the interactive broadcasting sector struggling to grow, Liberty 
Media acquired OpenTV in May 2002, noting that “[t]hey have a great 
customer base, fantastic technology and a significant intellectual property 
portfolio that will lay the groundwork to help us to change the business 
model over time, with a new and expanded focus on applications, interactive 
advertising and [television commerce].”126 Several months later, OpenTV 
cut its operations. 127  The Kudelski Group, which specialized in digital 




 123. See Menell, supra note 6, at 348–49. 
 124. See id.; cf. Bill Menezes, Sun Kicks off Java TV Push, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Sept. 19, 1999) 
(describing one of Sun’s last ditch efforts to monetize its Java investments), 
https://www.multichannel.com/news/sun-kicks-java-tv-push-137780.  Judge Alsup played a central role 
in the battle over Java following Sun’s demise. See Menell, supra note 6, at 355–57 (section entitled “The 
Setting Sun”). 
 125. The USPTO database shows that OpenTV was the assignee of 169 patents issued between 1996 
and 2019. See USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database (assignee name search: OpenTV), 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm. 
 126. See Monica Hogan & Karen Brown, Liberty Unit Buys OpenTV, ACTV, MULTICHANNEL NEWS 
(May 12, 2002), https://www.multichannel.com/news/liberty-unit-buys-opentv-actv-137833.   
 127. See Richard Shim, OpenTV to lay off nearly half of staff, CNET (Oct. 14, 2002), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/opentv-to-lay-off-nearly-half-of-staff/.   
 128. See Press Release, Kudelski Acquires Controlling Interest in OpenTV (Oct. 19, 2006), 
https://www.nagra.com/media-center/press-releases/kudelski-acquires-controlling-interest-opentv. 
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campaign around 2012 and obtained settlements with Google, Cisco, Netflix, 
and Apple by 2016.129 
As alleged in Comcast’s complaint, OpenTV’s Vice President for 
Licensing contacted Comcast in October 2015 “to start a dialogue” about 
licensing its patent portfolio, which it was then asserting against various 
companies in related lines of business (Verizon, Yahoo!, Time Warner 
Cable, and Hulu) and threatening to assert against Comcast.130 After two 
meetings in which OpenTV identified several patents that it believed 
Comcast was infringing, Comcast filed a complaint in October 2016 seeking 
a declaratory judgment that its devices and services did not infringe ten 
OpenTV patents relating to set-top box user interface and user experience. 
In December 2016, Nagravision, another division of the Kudelski Group, 
filed an infringement complaint against Comcast alleging infringement of 
three set-top box security patents in E.D. Tex.131 In January 2017, OpenTV 
(in conjunction with Nagravision and Kudelski SA) filed a complaint with 
the U.S. International Trade Commission seeking to exclude Comcast 
products from the United States based on alleged infringement of three 
OpenTV patents—two being asserted in the N.D. Cal. complaint and one in 
the E.D. Tex. litigation.132 Comcast amended its N.D. Cal. complaint to add 
the three security patents asserted in the E.D. Tex. case.133 
Judge Alsup announced the patent “shootout” at the March 8, 2017 
hearing: 
 
 The plaintiff [Comcast] would . . . pick one claim out of one patent 
that’s being asserted. And you bring a motion that shows how ridiculous 
this is, if you think it’s ridiculous. 
 [OpenTV] pick[s] . . . just one claim, your silver bullet, which may 
lead to a preliminary injunction if you win. You pick your best claim. 
 
 129. See Reuters, Apple and the Owner of OpenTV Just Settled Their Patent Dispute, FORTUNE (Aug. 
3, 2016) (reporting that the deal settled a N.D. Cal. patent case and includes a “comprehensive patent 
license agreement” with Apple; and that UBS estimates that Kudelski “likely received one-time payments 
totaling . . . $62 million to $83 million”), http://fortune.com/2016/08/03/apple-kudelski-patent-dispute-
europe-germany-settled/. 
 130. See Complaint For Declaratory Judgment Of Patent Noninfringement, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 18–
19. 
 131. See Nagravision SA v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-1362-JRG, 2017 WL 
5257009 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (Nagravision is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Kudelski Group, 
which owns the OpenTV patents). 
 132. See In re Matter of Certain Dig. Television Set-Top Boxes, Remote Control Devices, And 
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1041 (Jan. 27, 2017), 
http://www.itcblog.com/images/kudelskicomplaint.pdf. 
 133. See First Amended Complaint For Declaratory Judgment Of Patent Noninfringement, Comcast 
Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2016). 
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 Then in a few weeks we’ll have a hearing, a shootout. You [Comcast] 
get to shoot down the one that is the most ridiculous. You get to shoot—
present the one that has the most traction. And I promise you, if they win, 
maybe there’s going to be a preliminary injunction. 
 This will bring an end to this case. This is the way to get—you-all are 
throwing patents around like they’re candy. But we’ve got to get down to 
the meat of it at some point, instead of just blather. 
 So you can pick out one. You ought to know by now which one your 
best one is. If you don’t, you haven’t done your job. And you ought to 
know which one is the most weakest. You ought to know how—you ought 
to know whether they read on your products or not. 
. . . 
 I have seen this over 17 years on the bench. The plaintiff, the patent 
holder, doesn’t actually have a clue. I’m not saying this is . . . what I’ve 
learned about the patent cases. 
 Your side generically—maybe not you—has no clue. They just think 
probably we can make a case once we got in their files, we would find 
some dumb email that they wrote that looks like it reads on our patent, 
something that said, oh, maybe we ought to get a license to the ‘586 
[patent]. Find something like that. And then suddenly you’ve got the one 
smoking gun that makes a case. 
 That—I don’t like that. Now maybe you had done a better—you 
should have reverse engineered every one of these. It’s possible to do. You 
buy one of these boxes, take it apart. An engineer can tell you in one day 
whether or not it infringes. 
 And you ought to be able to pick out the one where you definitely 
don’t infringe and—but we’re going to start doing it one claim at a time 
until . . . one of you is shown to be ridiculous. Because I believe that if 
there is–if there is infringement, then we’ll just enter the preliminary 
injunction. All these set-top boxes will be ceased to be used. 
 On the other hand, if you convince me that this claim is ridiculous, I 
am not going to pay a big—a sanction. So there will be some skin in the 
game here. You two can’t just keep litigating this forever. That’s the way 
I think this ought to be managed . . . .134 
 
Shortly thereafter, Judge Alsup issued a case management order 
providing for summary judgment motions to be filed by June 26, 2017, for a 
hearing scheduled for early August.135 
Only one party brought a patent to the big showdown on August 3, 
2017, at the N.D. C[orr]al. After Comcast identified its first claim, OpenTV 
 
 134. Transcript of Proceedings at 26–27, 35–36, Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., 
No. 3:16-cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2017)(Document 79) .  
 135. See Case Management Order Re Pilot Summary Judgment Motions, Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 
LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017). 
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granted Comcast a covenant not to sue on the patent.136 When Comcast 
identified another claim for the showdown, OpenTV again granted Comcast 
a covenant not to sue on that patent.137 This occurred, as Judge Alsup had 
foretold, on the other two claims (and patents) that Comcast identified, as 
well as two of the three patents asserted in the E.D. Tex. case.138 
As foreshadowed, things did not go well for OpenTV at the showdown. 
Judge Alsup opened the summary judgment hearing by announcing: “Well, 
let me just say there is one issue in which I’m inclined to rule for 
Comcast. . . .” 139  Judge Alsup entertained OpenTV’s argument that the 
accused device infringed the asserted claim, but was not swayed.140 
He then turned to the issue of attorneys’ fees: 
 
 When you started this case, you asserted a portfolio [of] patents, all 
in this general area, and I think you just assumed that somewhere—
somewhere deep in the bowels of one of these—that you’d be able to pull 
a rabbit out of the hat . . . but . . . specific claims [] have to be proven. 
 And so I think you should have done more homework before you 
launched this lawsuit. I know they launched the lawsuit, but you made 
them launch it by threatening to sue them. 
 So is this really what the patent system is supposed to do to the federal 
court system? I mean, part of this is your fault, Comcast’s side. 
 You wanted me just to be your [early neutral evaluation] guy. . . . 
That I’m supposed to come in here and spend hours, days, weeks, pouring 
over these claims and trying to figure out what they mean, and it would go 
on forever, and meanwhile, other cases would suffer because of Comcast. 
 We have a lot of cases to do, and I’ve given your case a lot of time. 
And I asked you to bring the very best, strongest claim, and this is how 
strong it is: In my opinion, it’s very weak.141 
 
In the end, the parties settled the case with OpenTV granting Comcast 
covenants not to sue on the ten patents asserted in the original complaint, and 
Comcast agreeing to terminate its Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) proceedings 
on two of the patents while also agreeing that it would not initiate any future 
IPR proceedings on the patents at issue so long as OpenTV or a future 
 
 136. See Transcript of Proceedings of Aug. 3, 2017, at 36–37, Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. 
OpenTV, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017). (Document 184). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 37–38. 
 139. See id. at 4. 
 140. See id. at 4–17, 32–33. 
 141. See id. at 35–36. 
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assignee does not threaten or bring any further action against Comcast on 
these patents.142 Furthermore, OpenTV relinquished its right to appeal the 
showdown. Finally, Comcast agreed not to file any motion for fees, costs, or 
sanctions arising out of the N.D. Cal. litigation. 
Judge Alsup’s procedure appears to have called OpenTV’s bluff, 
although due to the confidential nature of the settlement of all of the various 
actions between OpenTV and Comcast, it is impossible to know for sure how 
the parties fared. But circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that 
the procedure unraveled OpenTV’s assertion strategy. First, OpenTV agreed 
not to pursue any appeal. Second, and most revealing, the Kudelski Group 
announced at the end of 2017 that it “has undertaken a deep transformation 
of its structure, processes and business, with the objective of ensuring the 
Group’s growth and success over the long term[,]…has continued its efforts 
to align its digital TV operations with the new market realities, [and] [is] 
expanding out of traditional pay TV.”143 
2. Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc. 
Shortly after the Comcast v. OpenTV litigation wrapped up, Finjan sued 
Juniper Networks on September 29, 2017, in N.D. Cal. alleging infringement 
of eight U.S. patents relating to computer security.144 The case was assigned 
to Judge Alsup. Encouraged by the apparent success of the Comcast v. 
OpenTV experiment, Judge Alsup implemented the second showdown in 
Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc. 
Before turning to the showdown, it is useful to examine Finjan’s 
development arc. Finjan traces back to the mid-1990s when Shlomo 
Touboul, an Israeli inventor and entrepreneur, developed methods to protect 
the emerging Internet from hackers.145 The Internet was just taking off, and 
 
 142. See Stipulation Resolving All Outstanding Issues In Dispute In Pending Case And For Dismissal 
Of All Claims And Counterclaims; Order, Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. OpenTV, Inc., No. 3:16-
cv-06180-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (Document No. 190). 
 143. See Kudelski Group transformation is accelerating in H2 2017, NAGRA KUDELSKI (Dec. 20, 
2017) (“Concerning Intellectual Property licensing, the evolution of these initiatives continues to be 
marked by high volatility . . . .  In this context, the Group entered into a settlement agreement with 
Comcast Corporation and Comcast Cable Communications LLC pursuant to which all pending patent 
litigations between the companies have been dismissed. The terms of the settlement were not disclosed.”) 
https://dtv.nagra.com/kudelski-group-transformation-accelerating-h2-2017. 
 144. See Complaint For Patent Infringement; Demand For Jury Trial, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper 
Networks, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (Document 1)[hereinafter Finjan 
complaint]. 
 145. See Finjan Cybersecurity, Annual Report 2016, at 2, 
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/f/NASDAQ_FNJN_2016.pdf. 
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Touboul foresaw that the Java programming environment, which was rapidly 
being adopted, created some security vulnerabilities. Touboul’s first patents 
claimed methods for identifying suspicious patterns and behaviors of 
Internet-delivered content. 146  Finjan attracted significant research and 
development investment and obtained three patents based on its founder’s 
early research. 147  It initially commercialized this technology by selling 
security products and operating a Malicious Code Research Center.148 Finjan 
continued to pursue research and development on cybersecurity, for which it 
pursued and obtained a steady flow of patents building on its pioneering 
works and advances in Internet technology.149 
In 2005, Finjan negotiated an $8 million investment/patent license with 
Microsoft after Finjan disclosed security vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s XP 
operating system.150 It also embarked on a patent enforcement campaign 
against alleged infringers.151 
In 2009, Finjan spun off hardware and technology assets in a merger 
and entered into a non-compete agreement that barred its continued 
operations.152  Upon the expiration of that agreement in 2015, Finjan re-
entered the market for secure mobile consumer products and embarked on a 
widespread patent enforcement campaign153 It currently earns approximately 
90 percent of its revenues from patent licensing.154 
 
 146. See, e.g., System and Method for Protecting a Computer and a Network from Hostile 
Downloadables, U.S. Pat. No. 6,092,194 (issued July 18, 2000). 
 147. See id.; System and method for attaching a downloadable security profile to a downloadable, 
U.S. Pat. No. 6,154,844 (issued Nov. 28, 2000); System and method for protecting a client during runtime 
from hostile downloadables, U.S. Patent No. 6,167,520 (issued Dec. 26, 2000). 
 148. See Finjan Complaint, supra note 144, at 2. 
 149. See Finjan Holdings, Form 10-K (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fiscal Year ended 
Dec. 31, 2017), at 11–12 (listing over 60 patents, of which 10 had expired), https://ir.finjan.com/annual-
reports/content/0001366340-18-000013/0001366340-18-000013.pdf. 
 150. See Scott Bekker, Finjan Gets Investment from Microsoft, REDMOND MAGAZINE (July 21, 
2005), https://redmondmag.com/articles/2005/07/21/finjan-gets-investment-from-microsoft.aspx; Finjan 
Holdings, Form 10-K, supra note 149 at 4. 
 151. See Demand For Jury Trial, Finjan Software Ltd., v. Secure Computing Corp., et al., No. 1:06-
cv-00369-GMS (D. Del. June 4, 2006) (asserting U.S. Pat. No. 6,092,194); Demand For Jury Trial, 
Finjan, Inc. v. McAfee, Inc., et al., No. 1:10-cv-00593-UNA (D. Del. July 12, 2010) (asserting U.S. Pat. 
No. 6,092,194 and U.S. Pat. No. 6,480,962). 
 152. See Finjan Complaint, supra note 144, at 2. 
 153. See Finjan Holdings, Form 10-K, supra note 149, at 4; Joseph Marks, Finjan Is Cybersecurity’s 
Top Patent Litigator, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 8, 2016) (reporting that “Finjan Holdings Inc. has sued a 
who’s-who of cybersecurity companies for patent infringement, including four of the 10 largest pure-play 
cybersecurity companies in the business”), https://www.bna.com/finjan-cybersecuritys-top-
n73014445998/. 
 154. See Marks, supra note 153.  
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Finjan’s lawsuit against Juniper Networks is part of a widespread patent 
enforcement campaign in N.D. Cal.155 Several of those cases have produced 
sizeable recoveries. 156  In addition, Finjan has derived substantial patent 
licensing revenue as direct and indirect results of its enforcement 
campaign.157 
Judge Alsup viewed the Finjan case, which like OpenTV involved a 
large number of patent claims, as a prime candidate for his innovative case 
management method. The February 22, 2018 hearing set the stage for this 
digital frontier showdown: 
 
 THE COURT: Unless you’re about to tell me you’ve settled your 
case, I have a plan for your case. . . . It’s a two-part plan. First part is a 
normal schedule. Second is the shoot-out schedule. Are you ready? 
 Any initial disclosures should have already been done . . . . The pre-
trial conference would be June 6—D Day—next year. Trial will be [July 
8, 2019] . . . . And that will be a jury trial. . . .  
 And I will have to ask this question: These patent cases are so 
contentious and so unreasoned, the lawyers are so unreasonable in these 
cases that I normally keep all discovery disputes. But patent cases the 
lawyers can’t agree on anything. However, if you promise me you will be 
reasonable on both sides and that there will be very few discovery disputes 
I will keep all discovery disputes. 
 COUNSEL FOR JUNIPER NETWORKS (DEFENDANT): Your 
Honor, we intend to be reasonable. Assuming that the other party is 
reasonable, I think we can limit discovery motions. 
 COUNSEL FOR FINJAN (PATENTEE/PLAINTIFF): Your 
Honor, we’re very reasonable. We give up everything. 
 THE COURT: All right . . . . I’m going to keep [discovery matters] 
for myself and see if it works . . . . So that’s the overall case schedule. Do 
you have any heartburn on this? 
 COUNSEL FOR JUNIPER NETWORKS: Your Honor, one 
comment. The parties had actually worked together to come to an agreed 
schedule. 
 THE COURT: I know. It was too leisurely. It would call for a trial 
in 2020 . . . . I won’t even be alive probably in 2020. I’ve never set a case 
that far out in my entire career. You lawyers are going to have to get going. 
This is plenty of time. 
 
 155. Finjan has filed more than two dozen patent enforcement actions in N.D. Cal. since 2013. See 
Bloomberg Law Dockets Search (Mar. 1, 2019). 
 156. See Finjan Holdings, Form 10-K, supra note 149, at 4, 7–8 (noting a $39.5 jury verdict against 
Blue Coat Systems (N.D. Cal.) in 2015 and a $15 million jury verdict against Sophos (N.D. Cal.) in 2016). 
 157. See Finjan Holdings, Form 10-K, supra note 149, at 4, 6–9 (reporting that Finjan generated 
gross revenue of approximately $50.5 million in 2017, $18.4 million in 2016, and $4.7 million in 2015). 
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 COUNSEL FOR FINJAN: Your Honor, it’s fine for plaintiff. 
Works for us. 
 COUNSEL FOR JUNIPER NETWORKS: Your Honor, we think 
it’s a little advanced given the number of patents at issue in the case and 
then— 
 THE COURT: Too bad. You can do this. That’s where the shoot-
out comes in. Are you ready? The shoot-out is a great thing that I have 
come up with. It works as follows: 
How many claims are involved here? 
 COUNSEL FOR FINJAN: We’ve agreed to limit it to 16 claims on 
the patents. 
 THE COURT: Sixteen from how many patents? 
 COUNSEL FOR FINJAN: Eight patents. 
. . .  
 THE COURT: Okay. So of the 16, each of you get to pick one. 
Plaintiff gets to pick your strongest claim and Juniper gets to pick the 
weakest of the claims. And then you’re going to both make motions. 
[You]’re going to each have discovery. I’ll give you reasonable discovery 
into those two. This is in addition to all the other discovery that’s going 
on. But you get discovery into each of those two on kind of a compressed 
schedule. And if anybody stonewalls, believe me their motion won’t get 
granted. You better cooperate on this discovery. So you both are going to 
cross-move for summary judgment. This is in addition to all the other 
discovery that’s going on. But you get discovery into each of those two 
. . . . But in the past it’s quite clear that one side or the other is absolutely 
correct. What does that mean? It means that it either leads to an immediate 
preliminary injunction—that would be bad for Juniper—or, it leads to a 
sanctions motion against the plaintiff. Or it might even be a sanctions 
motion against the defendant. 
 This is—it just cuts to the heart of the case so quickly. I promise you 
by August of this year [2018] the case will be over because one of you—
I know these patent cases. They’re very few where there’s a fact issue; 
maybe one out of three. Two out of three it’s quite clear that either the 
plaintiff is way off base, which was true in the last case that I did, or that 
the Juniper side is way off base. 
 And there’s nothing wrong with a preliminary injunction right off the 
bat. In fact, it would be a permanent injunction because it’s the result of 
summary judgment if you in fact are infringing. You don’t have to wait 
until the end of the case. Whamo, the product goes off the shelf. 
 So this gets it do[w]n[] to one—each side has one. 
 Now here’s the other trick I found in doing this. That as soon as the 
Juniper side decides, [“]Oh, we’re going to go with claim number eight on 
the XYZ patent,[”] and you [Finjan] withdraw that patent. They withdrew 
eight—eight—claims in seriatim. And finally—this is how bad it was in 
the other case. I don’t know if you’re going to do that or not. 
FOCUSING PATENT LITIGATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019 9:17 PM 
482 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 18:3 
 So I’m going to give you two weeks from today to withdraw 
whatever you want. After that you’re stuck with it . . . So after two weeks 
[defendant counsel] can pick the weakest [claim that the patentee has]. 
That’s what I want you to do. Pick the weakest one they’re asserting 
against you. And if it turns out you’re just crystal clear on that one, even 
if you might lose on the other one, you’re going to get sanctions against 
them if it warrants sanctions. And they will have to pay that right off the 
bat. Could be hundreds of thousands of dollars for having brought a bogus 
claim against Juniper. 
 But if they win on theirs, it’s injunction city. So this is why it’s called 
a shoot-out. It’s like the shoot-out at the OK Corral in Tombstone, 
Arizona. Where the lawyers go in there and they just shoot it out and one 
of them comes out alive. 
 I shouldn’t use that. That’s a terrible example to use these days so 
I’m going to take that back. Maybe I’ll call it something else. 
 COUNSEL FOR FINJAN: It would be the Earps on this side. 
 THE COURT: It’s not going to be—it is not going to be—maybe 
shootout is the—showdown. That’s what it is. It’s a showdown. 
 All right. So I’m giving you two weeks from today to do. . .the 
withdrawal. [Each side will notify the other [as to which patent claim you 
are] going to be pursuing [by March 22]. 
 And then the summary judgment motions on [these] have to be filed 
June 7. So you have a period of a few months in there to do your discovery 
. . . [Y]ou’ll have a chance to depose the experts on the other side. So 
there’s one week built in there for each of you to have an extra week on 
opposition . . . . 
 So on July 26[,] I anticipate that there will be banners in the sky for 
one side or the other as total victory is proclaimed. At least—so on the 
other hand I could be wrong and it could turn out to be one of those cases 
where there’s fact issues and I have to deny [summary judgment]. 
 But I’ll tell you, I learn a lot about even if that’s the way it is, I will 
learn a lot. It will be effectively a tutorial for me. 
 So that’s the way we’re going to proceed. Go back and tell your 
clients that the day of reckoning is close at hand. 
 All right. I’ll get out an order that be sure to read the order whenever 
it comes out on this summary procedure. 
 And then we’ll eventually get around to all the other claims in the 
case. So don’t worry that there will be some there will be other—we’ll 
deal with everything. But it may be that as the case goes along we have a 
permanent injunction against a product that’s no longer being sold. That 
could happen. Or it could be [the patentee] has to pay $300,000 in fees to 
the other side for bringing a frivolous claim. Or maybe [the defendant has] 
to pay $300,000 to [the patentee] because [the defendant] picked a bad 
[claim]. 
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 So this gets to the heart of the matter so quickly and so cleanly instead 
of you all treating me like your early neutral evaluation judge and two 
years later I’m still trying to figure out which end is up.158 
 
The parties proceeded toward the showdown, but the process proved 
less decisive than promised. Finjan selected claim 10 of U.S. Patent No. 
8,677,494 (the ‘494 patent) as its best claim. Juniper Networks selected claim 
1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,804,780 (the ‘780) patent as the most vulnerable 
claim. The parties filed their motions on June 28 and their replies on July 
12. 159  The court heard argument on the parties’ respective motions for 
summary judgment on July 26, 2018.160 
On August 9, Judge Alsup granted summary judgment (based on non-
infringement) for Juniper Networks on claim 1 of the ‘780 patent.161 The 
decision turned on a contested claim construction distinction on which Judge 
Alsup disagreed with a claim construction ruling issued by another N.D. Cal. 
judge in a separate Finjan case.162 On August 24, Judge Alsup granted in part 
Finjan’s motion for summary judgement on claim 10 of the ‘494 patent while 
reserving for trial whether the accused products meet the “database” 
limitation of the claim, Juniper’s Section 101 invalidity defense, and specific 
damages issues.163 
Judge Alsup presided over a limited jury trial that began on December 
10, 2018. The parties stipulated that Judge Alsup could decide the patent 
eligibility question after the jury trial. 164  Judge Alsup excluded Finjan’s 
 
 158. See Transcript of Proceedings of Feb. 22, 2018, at 2–9, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., 
No. 17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2018) (Document 44); Amended Case Management Order 
And Reference To Magistrate Judge For Mediation/Settlement, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 
17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018) (Document 35). 
 159. See Amended Case Management Order And Reference To Magistrate Judge For 
Mediation/Settlement, supra note 158. 
 160. See Transcript Of Proceedings of July 26, 2018, at 41–115, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, No. 
3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018) (Document 175) 
 161. See Order Granting Early Motion For Summary Judgment On ‘780 Patent (Aug. 9, 2018), 
Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2018) (Document 
175). 
 162. See id. at 9–10; Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 17–00072 BLF, 2018 WL3537142 (N.D. 
Cal. July 23, 2018). 
 163. See Order Granting In Part Early Motion For Summary Judgment On ‘494 Patent, Finjan, Inc. 
v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2018) (Document 189). 
 164. See Scott Graham, Juniper Gets Double Trial Win in Cybersecurity Spat With Finjan: Irell 
persuaded Judge William Alsup to block Finjan from seeking $60 million in damages and got the jury to 
find the patent claim was not infringed, THE RECORDER (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/12/17/juniper-gets-double-trial-win-in-cybersecurity-spat-with-
finjan/. In light of the jury’s non-infringement verdict, Judge Alsup determined that the patent eligibility 
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damages expert and lay witnesses from testifying.165 The jury returned a 
verdict of non-infringement of the ‘494 patent.166 
Judge Alsup’s ominous warning to the litigants back in February 2017 
that “the day of reckoning is close at hand” has not yet come to fruition, and 
is unlikely to occur any time soon. The parties continue to litigate other 
patent claims in the case.167 Finjan has not backed down168 and the case is 
either headed for a second showdown (and possibly more) 169  or an 
interlocutory appeal of the showdown procedure.170 
D. Examination of the Patent Showdown 
As noted at the outset, I share Judge Alsup’s stated goals of streamlining 
patent litigation, discouraging the assertion of numerous, vague, and dubious 
claims, and providing litigants with a “fair hearing.” 171  Based on the 
disclosures in Judge Alsup’s essay and the publicly available filings in the 
 
challenge was moot. See Post-Trial Order, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2019) (Document 348). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See Special Verdict Form, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 2018) (Document 333); Scott Graham, Juniper Gets Double Trial Win in Cybersecurity 
Spat With Finjan: Irell persuaded Judge William Alsup to block Finjan from seeking $60 million in 
damages and got the jury to find the patent claim was not infringed, THE RECORDER (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/12/17/juniper-gets-double-trial-win-in-cybersecurity-spat-with-
finjan/. 
 167. See, e.g., Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief For U.S. Patent No. 
7,418,731, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) 
(Document 347); Defendant Juniper Networks, Inc.’s Reply To Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Opening Claim 
Construction Brief For U.S. Patent No. 7,418,731, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2019) (Document 347). 
 168. Graham, supra note 164 (quoting Finjan Chief Intellectual Property Office Julie Mar-Spinola 
following the trial stating “[w]e’re disappointed, but not discouraged” and noting that post-trial motions 
lay ahead, and that Finjan is asserting other claims against Juniper that have yet to be tried.). 
 169. See Post-Trial Order, supra note 164 (noting that the second showdown procedure is scheduled 
to commence on Jan. 24, 2019); Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Notice Of Motion And Second Motion For Early 
Summary Judgment, Regarding Infringement Of Claim 1 Of U.S. Patent No. 8,141,154; Memorandum 
Of Points And Authorities, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 14, 2019)(Document 369); Defendant Juniper Networks, Inc.’s Motion For Summary Judgment 
Regarding Claim 9 Of U.S. Patent No. 6,804,780, Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) (Document 371)( . 
 170. See Letter from Rebecca L. Carson and Paul Andre to Judge Alsup (Feb. 28, 2019), Finjan, Inc. 
v. Juniper Network, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019)  (Document 381)  
(requesting more time to consider Judge Alsup’s suggestion at the Feb. 21 hearing that it would “certify 
the orders from the first phase of the ‘Patent Showdown’ proceedings for appeal if the parties agreed that 
the outcome of the appeal would dispose of the entire case, including the other asserted patents.”); Hannah 
Albarazi, Alsup Rips ‘Obstinate’ Attys, Patent ‘BS’ in Finjan-Juniper War, LAW 360 (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/technology/articles/1157965/alsup-rips-obstinate-attys-patent-bs-in-finjan-
juniper-war. 
 171. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 111. 
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two showdowns to date, however, I question whether the patent showdown 
works for all three intended purposes. 
The jury is still out on whether showdowns will result in swifter and 
less costly patent litigation. While the Comcast v. OpenTV showdown 
experiment achieved a quick resolution, it may well reflect the declaratory 
judgment posture of the litigation. Comcast, the patent infringement 
defendant, drove the litigation. It is unclear whether OpenTV would have 
selected so many patents (and claims) to assert. And it is likely that more 
traditional winnowing procedures would have narrowed the case. By 
contrast, the Finjan v. Juniper Networks case is a more typical litigation. It 
is not at all clear that the showdown procedure has or will produce more 
efficient or swift litigation. 
Thus, patent showdowns could well result in more costly and time-
consuming litigation. Moreover, the patent showdown approach raises 
serious fairness and due process concerns. Finally, while the patent 
showdown approach will likely discourage the assertion of patent filings in 
N.D. Cal., it will also shift such litigation elsewhere. 
As noted above,172 many patent jurists have implemented successful 
tools for winnowing patent claims before trial. The question is whether the 
showdown procedure improves upon this prior art based on the three 
principal criteria: streamlining efficiency, due process, and fairness. The 
premise of the showdown procedure is that litigating the single “best” and 
single “worst” patent claims can serve as a fair proxy for the entire litigation. 
This rests on several critical, and questionable, assumptions. 
First, the parties to a complex patent litigation may need discovery to 
assess the viability of their claims. Forcing parties to select the best and worst 
claims at a preliminary stage could skew assessment of the case, especially 
given the ambiguity in patent law standards. The state of patent eligibility 
law, 173  for example, creates tremendous uncertainty regarding whether 
patent claims are viable. Similarly, the uncertainty surrounding claim 
construction,174 which was a critical issue in both of the showdowns, can 
make claim selection especially difficult. 
Second, even strong patent claims might not be good candidates for 
summary adjudication. There might well be factual issues that a litigant is 
comfortable pursuing even if they do not have a valid basis for summary 
judgment. Requiring parties to proceed through summary judgment forces 
 
 172. See supra, Section I(B). 
 173. See supra note 96.   
 174. See generally Anderson and Menell, supra note 11 (discussing the relatively high reversal rate 
for claim construction). 
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an artificial process. It can also skew the choice of the “best” or “worst” 
patent claims. A party should be entitled to determine whether or not and 
how to pursue summary judgment. 
Third, some patent cases involve multiple technologies.175 The fact that 
one patent fails does not necessarily mean that other patents and technologies 
are doomed to failure. Judge Alsup’s approach puts tremendous pressure on 
the patentee to pursue one path. Although he leaves open the possibility of 
more showdowns, the sanction warnings, high costs, and tough talk create a 
Hobson’s choice. As reflected in the Finjan v. Juniper Networks case, Judge 
Alsup conditioned certification of an interlocutory appeal of the first 
showdown on the parties’ agreement that “the outcome of the appeal would 
dispose of the entire case, including the other asserted patents.”176 In essence, 
the patentee is forced to choose between pursuing its litigation through a 
series of showdowns or relinquish its remaining claims to get appellate 
review of the showdown process. 
Fourth, Judge Alsup’s admonitions that a ruling in the showdown for 
the patentee will result in “injunction city”177 and a ruling for the defendant 
will result in “big” sanctions 178  mischaracterizes the law. 179  Under the 
Supreme Court’s eBay decision, the granting of permanent injunctions 
following a finding of patent infringement should not be automatic, and the 
patentee bears the burden of proving that the equitable factors support the 
granting of injunctive relief.180 In fact, courts have rarely granted injunctive 
relief in NPE cases since the eBay ruling.181 Thus, the threat that a defendant 
 
 175. See Matthew Bultman, Don’t Expect a Rash of ‘Shootouts’, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/954146 (quoting Paul Ainsworth, a director at Sterne Kessler Goldstein 
& Fox PLLC: “[P]atent cases can be a little more complicated than just a single issue. I think it’s a little 
troubling to have to try and pick one claim to go forward on because there can be multiple types of 
technologies involved in any patent case.”). 
 176. See Letter from Rebecca L. Carson and Paul Andre to Judge Alsup (Feb. 28, 2019), supra note 
170. 
 177. See Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 22, 2018), supra note 158, at 6. 
 178. See Transcript of Proceedings (Mar. 8, 2017), supra note 134, at 36; Transcript of Proceedings 
of Feb. 22, 2018, supra note 158, at 8 (threatening $300,000 sanctions). 
 179. See Transcript of Proceedings of Feb. 22, 2018, supra note 158, at 5 (warning that the showdown 
procedure “means that it either leads to an immediate preliminary injunction—that would be bad for 
Juniper—or, it leads to a sanctions motion against the plaintiff. Or it might even be a sanctions motion 
against the defendant.”). 
 180. See supra note 81.  
 181. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1953, 1983 fig. 1, and 1988 fig. 3 (2016) (concluding that 
“district courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief for [NPEs] and other patent 
owners who do not directly compete . . . against an infringer”; finding that injunctions were granted 72.5 
percent of the time after eBay, but only 16 percent of the time for NPEs); cf. Ryan T. Holte & Christopher 
B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of 
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faces “injunction city” if they lose a showdown does not comport with the 
applicable standard. 
Similarly, under the Patent Act182  and the Supreme Court’s Octane 
Fitness decision, 183  district courts may only award attorneys’ fees in 
“exceptional cases,” i.e., cases which “stand[] out from others with respect 
to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both 
the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in 
which the case was litigated.”184 Judge Alsup’s stern warning that losing the 
showdown will likely result in “big” sanctions raises questions about 
whether he will be exercising the reasoned, case-by-case discretion that the 
law requires or has prejudged the case based on his prior experience. Perhaps 
losing the “best” and “weakest” claims is a proxy for “exceptional,” but 
given the rush to select claims and the uncertainty of patent law, such a 
threatened sanction raises concerns. 
Fifth, and perhaps most significantly, requiring a patentee to pursue its 
case through a patent showdown or a series of patent showdowns arguably 
undermines the Seventh Amendment jury trial right.185 A key element of a 
jury trial is presenting a cohesive account of the underlying conduct and facts 
as alleged and further developed through the discovery process. 186  In 
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,187  the Supreme Court 
recognized that partial trials could violate the Seventh Amendment 
guarantee.188 The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Katz Interactive Call 
 
eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 187–88 (2017) (finding that the Federal Circuit is generally more favorable 
to prevailing patentees regarding injunctive relief than the district courts following eBay). 
 182. 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
 183. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014); supra note 97.  
 184. Id.  
 185. See U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931). 
 186. Cf. Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 
233, 241 (2015) (questioning whether jury trials should be drama events and advocating staged litigation). 
As reflected in the PCMJG3d, supra note 12, staged litigation often provides the best approach to patent 
case management. That said, the patent showdown model is an extreme form that arguably goes too far 
in dividing the patent causes of action into discrete questions. 
 187. 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931). 
 188. See Gasoline Prods. Co., 283 U.S. at 500 (holding that “the question of damages on the 
counterclaim is so interwoven with that of liability that the former cannot be submitted to the jury 
independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial of a fair 
trial.”). 
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Processing Patent Litigation189 upheld winnowing of duplicative claims190 
but warned that: 
 
[i]n approving the district court’s procedure, we do not suggest that a 
district court’s claim selection decisions in a complex case such as this one 
are unreviewable. Katz could have sought to demonstrate that some of its 
unselected claims presented unique issues as to liability or damages. If, 
notwithstanding such a showing, the district court had refused to permit 
Katz to add those specified claims, that decision would be subject to 
review and reversal.[9] 191 
 
[9] It is also conceivable that a claim selection order could come too early 
in the discovery process, denying the plaintiff the opportunity to determine 
whether particular claims might raise separate issues of infringement or 
invalidity in light of the defendants’ accused products and proposed 
defenses. Katz makes no such argument in this appeal.  
 
Footnote 9 speaks directly to concerns that have been raised about the 
showdown procedure.192 Notwithstanding district courts’ “broad discretion 
 
 189. 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see supra, text accompanying notes 111–13. 
 190. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d at 1311 (observing that 
“[w]hen the claimant is in the best position to narrow the dispute, allocating the production burden to the 
claimant will benefit the decision-making process and therefore will not offend due process unless the 
burden allocation unfairly prejudices the claimant’s opportunity to present its claim.”). 
 191. Id. at 1312–13. 
 192. For example, Counsel for OpenTV expressed the need for discovery: 
Judge Alsup: . . . You ought to know. You should have done reverse engineering. You ought to have an 
expert who can read your patent right on it. You don’t need any discovery. 
OpenTV counsel: Well, this — 
Judge Alsup: I’m going to give you discovery. But don’t give me that old “I need discovery” excuse. 
Come on. You should have reverse engineered this product up and down instead of just speculating.  
OpenTV counsel: Your Honor, as a declaratory judgment defendant who was [haled] into court here on 
our patents – we were trying to negotiate a license. We find ourselves in court, Your Honor— 
Judge Alsup: You can reverse engineer. Better hurry up and get your reverse engineering going. 
OpenTV counsel: We are about to give infringement contentions that will have the information we have. 
It will be detailed. However, as a litigant in federal court, we are entitled to at least some discovery. 
Judge Alsup: You are going to get discovery. I’m telling you, you should have reverse engineered this 
already. And you should have an expert who is prepared to come in here and be cross-examined that can 
prove up that your claim reads on that product.   
OpenTV counsel: Your Honor, we are . . . very happy with the work that we have done. We have a lot 
of evidence – 
Judge Alsup: It sounds to me like you’re not happy with it, and you’ve got to find something in their 
files to make your case because you don’t have a case. That’s what – that’s the way I read what you’re 
telling me. 
See Transcript of Proceedings (Mar. 8, 2017), supra note 134, at 29–30; see also Bultman, supra note 
175 (quoting Michael Sandonato, a partner at Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto, stating that restricting a 
patent owner’s case has the potential to raise some concerns about fairness). 
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to administer the proceeding” in complex cases, 193  the strict and rigid 
constraints of the showdown procedure could “prejudice . . . the claimant’s 
opportunity to present its claim.”194 
Finally, looking to the broader effects of the showdown procedure on 
the larger patent system, competition, and innovation, the N.D. Cal. patent 
showdown is more likely to steer patentees away from N.D. Cal. than solve 
the fundamental problems posed by software patents.195 Judge Alsup’s view 
of the patent system reflects his particular vantage point. He characterizes 
the ten-fold increase in N.D. Cal. patent filings between 1981 and 2017 as 
proof that software patent litigation has transformed patent litigation. 196 
Almost all of that growth, however, took place before the software patent 
explosion. Patent filings in have been relatively stable since the bursting of 
the dot-com bubble, hovering between 160 to 260 per year during the past 
two decades. 
By contrast, patent case filings in E.D. Tex. and D. Del. have truly 
skyrocketed in the post-dot-com bubble burst era. As reflected in Figure 1, 
patent filings in E.D. Tex. grew from 285 in 2010 to over 2,500 in 2015. In 
one year, E.D. Tex. attracted more patent filings than N.D. Cal. witnessed 
during the past 20 years! Patent filings in D. Del. grew from 253 in 2010 to 
1,334 in 2013. Moreover, these districts have far fewer judges than N.D. Cal. 













 193. In re Phenylpropanolamine (“PPA”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 194. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d at 1311. 
 195. Even before the introduction of the patent showdown procedure, many litigators representing 
patentees already viewed the Northern District of California skeptically.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan 
M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1054–55 (2017); See 
Adam Mossoff & Ted M. Sichelman, Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging 
Caution on the VENUE Act 1 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816062 (“The reality is that the 
major proponents of changing the venue rules are primarily large high-tech companies and retailers with 
an online presence sued in the Eastern District of Texas that would rather litigate in a small number of 
more defendant-friendly jurisdictions.”). 
 196. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 112 Fig. 1.  
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The Supreme Court’s T.C. Heartland venue decision sought to address 
the national forum shopping problem by limiting patentees’ ability to select 
the inconvenient, trial-oriented culture E.D. Tex. Yet D. Del will remain an 
available venue for many cases since more than half of U.S. publicly traded 
companies and 64 percent of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in 
Delaware.197 Furthermore, many start-ups choose Delaware as their state of 
incorporation.198 
Thus, notwithstanding T.C. Heartland, Judge Alsup’s heavy-handed 
patent showdown procedure will channel software patent cases away from 
N.D. Cal. to D. Del. or other available venues.199 Even though there is a 
relatively small probability that a new patent filing will be assigned to Judge 
Alsup,200 the risks associated with the showdown procedure will increase the 
 
 197. See Christopher Wink, 64% of Fortune 500 Firms Are Delaware Incorporations: Here’s Why, 
TECHNICAL.LY DELAWARE (Sept. 23, 2014) (identifying three reasons for Delaware’s popularity for 
incorporation: “an established and business-friendly legal framework, a widely respected and specialized 
court system and pro-business priorities from state government”), 
https://technical.ly/delaware/2014/09/23/why-delaware-incorporation/. 
 198. See id. (noting that in 2012, more than 90 percent of IPOs were from Delaware legal entities, 
including Facebook and Yelp). 
 199. See Bultman, supra note 175 (noting that “Judge Alsup’s procedure is one more factor for patent 
owners to consider when deciding where to file their lawsuit . . . . [T]his is the type of practice that 
attorneys would look at when doing their venue analysis”). 
 200. There are more than 20 district judges and magistrate judges on the N.D. Cal. wheel. See U.S. 
District Court, Northern District of California, https://cand.uscourts.gov/judges. 
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propensity for patentees to shop elsewhere. A shift of cases away from N.D. 
Cal. is unfortunate because N.D. Cal. has a very strong and experienced 
bench with a well-developed set of sound patent case management practices. 
Moreover, it is a convenient forum for technology companies. Furthermore, 
D. Del. is swamped with patent cases and, unlike E.D. Tex., is not looking 
to increase its patent docket. 
None of this is to suggest that the patent showdown procedure should 
not be used with the consent of the parties. There may well be circumstances 
in which the parties would find such a procedure to fit their particular 
dispute. But it is important to note N.D. Cal.’s pioneering Patent Local Rules 
were developed with the input of the patent bar and promulgated under the 
authority of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.201 The carefully balanced 
quality of these rules and the manner in which they were adopted promoted 
their acceptance within the patent litigation bar and has earned the support 
of the Federal Circuit.202 
II. THE LONG-STANDING NEED FOR SOFTWARE PATENT REFORM 
As Judge Alsup’s essay suggests, the problems surrounding software 
patent litigation run deep. At best, the patent showdown addresses some of 
the symptoms of the larger pathology. And as discussed above, it is not at all 
clear that it ameliorates them. As Judge Alsup recognizes, there are 
significant limitations on a “lowly district judge[’s]” ability to address the 
larger software patent disease.203 
Notwithstanding that digital technology traces back well over a half 
century, Congress has never directly confronted the challenges of fitting this 
revolutionary new technology into the “one-size-fits-all” technologies patent 
system. Judge Alsup’s mentor, Justice William O. Douglas, presciently 
raised the issue in the Supreme Court’s first software patent case. He ended 
the Benson v. Gottschalk decision with the following suggestion: 
 
If [computer] programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are 
raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers 
of investigation are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide 
variety of views which those operating in this field entertain. The 
 
 201. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a) (“After giving public notice and an opportunity for comment, a district 
court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may adopt and amend rules governing its practice.”). 
 202. See, e.g., O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“[W]e see nothing in the Federal Rules that is inconsistent with [the Northern District of 
California’s] local rules requiring the early disclosure of infringement and invalidity contentions . . . .”). 
 203. See Alsup, supra note 1, at 111.   
 
FOCUSING PATENT LITIGATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019 9:17 PM 
492 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 18:3 
technological problems tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to 
us that considered action by Congress is needed.204 
 
Congress has yet to take up that suggestion. 
Like Judge Alsup, I have long been concerned with the challenges to 
the intellectual property system posed by digital technology. I began a 1987 
article with the observation that “[i]t became evident by the mid-1970s that 
intellectual work embodied in new technologies—in particular, computer 
software—did not fit neatly within the traditional forms of legal protection 
for intellectual property.”205 Based on the insights of network economics, the 
nature of computer programming, and the array of available intellectual 
property modes (patent, trade secrets, and copyright), I proposed that 
Congress develop a sui generis regime for protecting computer software: 
relatively short duration and allowance for compulsory licensing of widely 
adopted platform standards.206 
As Part I(A) explained, the intellectual property system for computer 
software muddled through the formative years. With the bursting of the dot-
com bubble, patent protection for computer software has become, as Judge 
Alsup recognized, a “plague on innovation.” While I don’t doubt that the 
inventors behind OpenTV’s and Finjan’s patents made technical advances, I 
question affording these inventions 20 years of protection. Trade secret and 
copyright provide significant protection for much computer software 
research and development. And computer software innovation does not 
typically require high capital investment or involve substantial scientific 
uncertainty. 
The problems lie well upstream from patent case management. As I 
suggested more than 30 years ago, the computer software industry and the 
public would be better served by a sui generis intellectual property regime 
for protecting computer software: far shorter duration, safety valves for 
network effects, better screening of patents and the vagueness of patent 
claims, and possibly greater leeway for judges to shift litigation costs. 
 
 204. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972); see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE 
OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 20–21 (1966) (recommending against patent protection for computer 
programs on several grounds: (1) lack of an adequate classification system; (2) the tremendous volume 
of prior art being generated, which would reduce patent examination to little more than registration; (3) 
the advancement of software innovation in the absence of patent protection; and (4) the availability of 
copyright protection). 
 205. See Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 8, at 1329. 
 206. Id. at 1371. 
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Any solution, however, must survive the legislative gantlet. While 
software patent legislation might have been achieved in the late 1980s before 
many of the major players had invested in software patent acquisition, the 
prospects for achieving broad consensus diminished by the mid-1990s.207 
Congress is struggling to address the confusion wrought by the Supreme 
Court’s incoherent guidance on patent eligibility, with software patents at 
the center of the controversy.208 
In the spirit of Judge Alsup’s showdown invention, I offered my own 
provocative method for addressing the political impediments to software 
patent reform a little over a decade ago. 209  Recognizing that the many 
companies that have developed vast patent arsenals would not be willing to 
walk away from these assets, I claimed:210 
1. A method for reforming the patent system comprising: 
diagnosing problems of the existing patent system in promoting progress 
in the useful arts; 
identifying and evaluating the net benefits of non-technology field-
specific reforms (systemic reforms); 
identifying and evaluating the net benefits of technology field-specific 
reforms (categorical reforms); 
evaluating the net benefits of combined systemic and categorical reforms; 
selecting the patent system reform or reforms offering the highest 
expected net benefits. 
2. The method described in Claim 1, wherein the categorical reforms are 
implemented through legislation that applies only prospectively.211 
 
 207. See Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for 
Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2651–53 (1994) (observing that “In view of the substantial 
vesting of economic interests that has already occurred around the existing legal regime for computer 
software, it is difficult to imagine Congress giving serious attention to a comprehensive reform effort 
without a crying need”); cf. Brenda Sandburg, A Modest Proposal: After Six Years of the Status Quo, 
Software Companies Urge Congress to Revamp the Patent System, THE RECORDER (May 5, 2005), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1115370308794. 
 208. See Davis, supra note 96 (observing that “[r]ewriting patent eligibility law will be a challenge, 
however, judging from what attendees said was a stark divergence of opinion among the industry 
representatives at the meeting. Life sciences and pharmaceutical companies, whose businesses are based 
on strong patents, called for the law to change so that fewer patents are invalidated on eligibility grounds.  
¶ However, representatives in the tech sector, which are often the target of patent suits and have benefited 
from current standards that make it relatively easy to invalidate patents, largely said at the meeting that 
no changes are needed. The members of Congress appeared to recognize that accounting for those 
conflicting views while drafting legislation will be challenging.”).  
 209. Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. 
REV. 487 (2007). 
 210. I dedicated this invention to the public. See id. at note †. 
 211. Id. at 508. 
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As suggested in that paper/patent application, Claim 1 would likely 
result in abolition or substantial shortening of the duration of software 
patents. It is Claim 2 that does the heavy lifting. By implementing the 
reforms on a prospective basis, the existing companies would gain 
immediate advantage from not having to deal with new (or as powerful) 
patentees and hence could see a direct benefit from passage of this 
legislation. Furthermore, they could stanch the wasteful flow of resources 
devoted to patent acquisition and patent litigation. 
I don’t have high hopes that this proposal will be adopted any time soon, 
but I do believe that it provides the best cure to the “plague on innovation” 
to which Judge Alsup refers.212 
III. JUDICIARY OVERLOAD 
Judge Alsup alludes to acute docket pressures as one of the forces 
driving him to implement strict patent case management practices: 
 
 [T]here’s a guy the government wants to put away for 135 months, 
and then I have to go to a case where they want me to construe 135 claims. 
My heart sinks that it would be like that today. . . . 213 
 The lawyers were presenting it to me as if I have to go through 133 
claims and construe them, read 13 patents and the prosecution histories 
and figure out what they meant and hear expert testimony. I said, “‘I have 
other things to do. People are going to miss out on their social security 
check because I can’t rule on their case. There’s got to be a better way.’”214 
 You wanted me just to be your [early neutral evaluation] guy. . . . 
That I’m supposed to come in here and spend hours, days, weeks, pouring 
over these claims and trying to figure out what they mean, and it would go 
on forever, and meanwhile, other cases would suffer . . . . We have a lot 
of cases to do, and I’ve given your case a lot of time.215 
 
I frequently hear similar concerns from judges at patent case 
management programs.216 The pressures are even greater in districts where 
judges carry five to ten times the patent caseloads handled by N.D. Cal. 
 
 212. See Alsup, supra note 1 at 112. 
 213. See id. at 112. 
 214. See id. at 122. 
 215. See Transcript of Proceedings (Aug. 3, 2017), supra note 136, at 35-36. 
 216. See HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE 
SYSTEM (1974-75), at 204–06 (testimony of Judge Henry Friendly) (noting that although patent appeals 
constitute only 2 percent of the caseload of the courts of appeals, the actual burden is “three to five times 
that figure” due to their difficulty). 
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judges. The problems of rising caseloads long predate the software patent 
explosion and pose a serious problem for a nation that believes in due process 
and the rule of law. 
Unfortunately, increasing caseloads are pushing judges to implement 
case management approaches that undermine due process. Judge Learned 
Hand warned that “[i]f we are to keep our democracy, there must be one 
commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.” 217  Judge Alsup’s essay 
unwittingly highlights the dilemma. 218  He justifies heavy-handed case 
management innovation based on his understandable concerns about the 
spillover effects of complex patent cases on urgent criminal law and public 
benefits cases. 
The solution, however, requires addressing much larger judiciary policy 
and resource questions. Nearly a century ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter and 
Professor James M. Landis remarked that “great judiciary acts, unlike great 
poems, are not written for all times.”219 From the time of the American 
Revolution through the early twentieth century, the United States reformed 
the federal judiciary at approximately 25-year intervals. Nearly half a 
century later, Professor Paul Carrington observed that “we have now set a 
new record for consecutive years of restraint from tinkering with the 
system.”220 Unfortunately, little has been done since that time to relieve the 
growing caseloads per federal judge.221 
These concerns should be confronted directly. The federal judiciary has 
a responsibility to ensure due process, fidelity to law, and fairness in all 
cases. The growth of patent litigation over the past several decades has added 
significantly to the burdens on the judiciary, especially in several district 
court outposts. Thus, in addition to fixing patent law, Congress needs to 
ensure that district judges in patent-heavy districts have the resources and 
 
 217. Cf. Learned Hand, Address before the Legal Aid Society of New York, (Feb. 16, 1951), 
http://www.legal-aid.org/en/las/thoushaltnotrationjustice.aspx; quoted in Victor Williams, A 
Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize 
the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling our National Houses of Justice and 
Establishing a Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 671 n. 38 
(1996). 
 218. A much younger William Alsup contributed to the judiciary reform debate in the 1970s. See 
William H. Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1313 (1974); 
William H. Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal of the Hruska Commission to Establish a National Court 
of Appeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 431, 452–55 (1976) (endorsing Judge Friendly’s alternative “counterplan” 
to the establishment of a National Court of Appeals). 
 219. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 107 
(The Macmillan Company 1927). 
 220. See Paul Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function 
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 (1969). 
 221. See Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity 
“Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2020). 
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time to administer justice fairly across the broad range of cases on their 
dockets. 
 
